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Nietzsche, George Grant and the Repsonse to Modernity 
Abstract
Nietzsche and Grant both challenge us to make a clear choice about what 
we believe the world and human beings to be, while describing clearly the con­
sequences of such a choice. This thesis attempts to clarify the choice with which 
they confront us, by examining what they say about three key topics: modernity, 
history and morality. In doing so, its aim is to highlight what it is that differentiates 
them and why.
The thesis draws two conclusions, one about the fundamental difference 
between Grant and Nietzsche and the other about the possible bases for a 
choice between their world views. (1)The fundamental difference between Grant 
and Nietzsche is that for Nietzsche the world is chaos, and being is becoming, 
while for Grant there is order and purpose in the world, and being is seen as 
unchanging goodness. It is these particular views of being that shape and influ­
ence what each says about modernity, history and morality. (2) The thesis 
argues that the basis for choosing between the world views of Nietzsche and of 
Grant must be faith or belief, rather than knowledge, for whatever reasons or 
justification one can give for choosing between being as becoming and being as 
unchanging goodness presuppose a context of being that is assumed or taken 
as already given.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
Although many have described George Grant as a political thinker, he is 
indeed much more than that. He considered himself first and foremost a 
debunker. His thinking spans a wide spectrum, intermingling religion and philoso­
phy, past and present, contemplating and reflecting upon the whole through the 
analysis and study of modernity and its destiny. His discussion takes place on 
different levels yet remains grounded in political philosophy, that is, in the world 
as it unfolds in its necessity, while articulating as well the insights that have been 
revealed to us from deep within our traditions. His language is dense, tight, a 
curious mixture of modern and classical terminology, yet every word has a pre­
cise meaning. Thus words such as 'love1, 'justice', 'beauty', 'necessity', and 
'chance' are rediscovered and remembered. Grant oscillates and mediates 
between philosophy and revelation, between the contingent and the given, 
between unity and particularity, maintaining throughout a vision of the whole 
which, while never defined in all its particulars, is all-encompassing in its 
breadth.
Nietzsche was also something of a debunker; his desire to expose the 
decadence and degeneration surrounding him drove him to great heights of lyri­
cism, to sharp witticism and biting critique. He also shares with Grant a capacity 
and desire to look upon the whole as opposed to being bogged down by the par­
ticular. He too reflected on good and evil, justice and destiny. At times, he seems 
to deliberately provoke us to go beyond good and evil and proclaim ourselves 
the masters of our destiny. He manages to expose us to a side of ourselves that
page 1
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we prefer not to dwell on. He points to our weaknesses and our contradictions as 
welts upon perfection, puts on display our mediocrity and our fears, inviting us to 
go beyond them and to enter the realm of the overman. Zarathustra speaks to 
those who would be like him.
Why choose to discuss the world views of George Grant and Friedrich 
Nietzsche in the context of modernity? Because they both urge us back to our 
primals — those things from which we originate. And yet the contrast between 
them is so sharp. Whereas Grant is a great advocate of Plato and Christianity, 
Nietzsche is their greatest critic and while Grant chooses truth Nietzsche choos­
es untruth. Even the r styles differ: whereas Nietzsche is flamboyant in style and 
often careless in his choice of words, Grant is concise and careful.
But there are also intriguing similarities. In terms of style, for instance, 
there is a terseness to their writing which clearly denotes underlying tensions in 
both Grant and Nietzsche. We find them similar also in their approach to subject 
matter for they both favor contemplation of the whole over painstaking particular­
ity. Indeed they address with the same passion and commitment issues which 
have troubled human beings for generations but which modem philosophy has 
generally shied away from discussing with any relevance, preferring instead to 
drown itself in the multiversity to which Grant refers. The questions they ask 
arise out of their particular experiences, but they both take us beyond the partic­
ular, to a differing vision of the whole. The focus of this thesis will be on how 
these two different, perhaps opposite visions, were shaped by the realities of the 
modem world.
page 2
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Indeed, despite their differences, Nietzsche and Grant offer sim ilar 
insights into the workings of the modem world. They both speak of the tension of 
the spirit which grips that world and which Nietzsche, in the introduction to 
Beyond Good and Evil, attributes to the struggle against Plato whom he accuses 
of “standing truth on her head and denying perspective itself, the basic condition 
of all life" (BGE,preface). Nietzsche speaks platonicism this as the great lie, 
started by Socrates the seducer, passed on and taken up by Plato, and which is 
an expression of the Apollonian spirit, that spirit which as “the lucent one, the 
god of light, reigns also over the fair illusion of our inner world of fantasy." Apollo 
himself "may be regarded as the marvelous divine image of the principium indi- 
viduationis, whose looks and gestures radiate the full delight, wisdom, and beau­
ty of 'illusion'" (BT, #1). The problem, according to Nietzsche, is that the 
Apollonian spirit has not, since the era of Greek tragedy, been properly balanced 
by the Dionysian spirit; producing a tension which is caused by the fact that the 
Apollonian image is not without its price. Indeed such an image "must incorpo­
rate that thin line which the dream image may not cross, under penalty of 
becoming pathological, of imposing itself on us as a crass reality: a discreet limi­
tation, a freedom from all extravagant urges, the sapient tranquility of the plastic 
god" (BT, #1). Nietzsche finds that Platonism, and Christianity subsequently, 
have used such dream images, images of a better, truer world, to impose upon 
us those limitations which we conceive of as good and evil. But these two influ­
ences, which have shaped the fabric of western civilization for two millennia, are 
coming apart at the seams for various reasons, as Nietzsche explains, and the 
result is the crisis of modernity: an opportunity and an opening. An opening, 
Nietzsche thinks, for the coming of the overman.
page 3
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Grant speaks of this modem tension of the spirit as the tension between 
revelation and reason, which comes to us out of our western traditions: Greek 
philosophy and trie Bible. This is the tension between the “claims of universal 
understanding which were found in the heights of Greek civilization" and the way 
that “Christianity opened men to a particular consciousness of time by opening 
them to anxiety and charity; how willing was exalted through the stamping 
proclamations cf the creating Will; how time was raised up by redemption in 
time, and the future by the exaltation of the eschaton" (TH, p.29). Grant, by 
acknowledging this tension, seems to be agreeing with Nietzsche that 
Christianity had within itself the seeds of its own destruction. That this is not the 
case we will discover as we discuss the differences and similarities in Grant's 
and Nietzsche's world views.
It may seem that these are two very different explanations of the tension 
of the spirit which grips the. modem world. Closer study, however, will reveal that 
Grant's analysis of this tension cuts across Nietzsche's. This is in part because 
Grant felt that there was some truth to Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity, and in 
part because Grant recognized Nietzsche's account of modernity in the reality of 
the modem world. Grant himself singles out and points to Nietzsche, acknowl­
edging him as “the thinker who thought the crisis of Western civilization most 
intensively and most comprehensively" (TH, p.5). He argues that at this time it is 
important to read and understand Nietzsche, because so much of what he said 
is now taken for granted, without the subtler, far-reaching implications of his 
thought being acknowledged:
though his more obvious teachings have become the 
platitudes of such schools as positivism and existent­
ialism, psychiatry and behavioral science, the subtler
page 4
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consequences of extremity he draws necessarily from 
them are not much contemplated. Most men want it 
both ways in thought and in practice; the nobility of 
Nietzsche is that he did not (TH , p.35).
Nietzsche's nobility, and Grant's, resides in the fact that both faced the 
question of being, answered it, and lived with the consequences of their answers 
without trying to hide behind epistemological difficulties. Indeed we will see that 
his stand on being is the rock upon which each they builds his world view. Upon 
it rests their views on modernity, history and morality. We will see, through them, 
why the question of being cannot be ignored. We will try to see why one chose 
being as becoming, and the other being as unchanging goodness, so that we 
may judge if one choice is better than the other.
Grant and Nietzsche are both first concerned with the modem world, so 
this is where our discussion will begin. Nietzsche's graphic descriptions of the 
last men, of the overmen, strike as deeply as Grant's analysis of our modem par­
adigm of knowledge and his appeal to tradition through the heart of the modem 
tension of the spirit. We will see that they both hold to a common vision of the 
modem world and of the struggles of human beings to come to grips with this 
reality. We will explore this common vision in the first chapter.
This will lead us in the second chapter to Nietzsche's and Grant's visions 
of history. Here their paths separate, since for Nietzsche there is no denying the 
finality of becoming , whereas Grant agrees with Plato that "time is the moving 
image of eternity." Their meeting place is the examination of the historical sense, 
which Nietzsche wants to see further developed, and which Grant claims is a
page 5
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manifestation of a particular conception of time as history.
The third chapter will focus on morality, more precisely on truth and justice 
and Nietzsche's and Grant's respective views on how life in the modem world 
should be led. Here they are so far apart that it seems almost impossible that 
they ever agreed on anything. Nietzsche challenges us to go beyond good and 
evil, to accept the finality of becoming, and to create our own values in such a 
way that life will be enhanced, and we will keep growing. Grant, on the other 
hand, presents us with a moving image of unchanging goodness which gives 
purpose and meaning to our lives.
What is most interesting about discussing Nietzsche and Grant together is 
that they both challenge us to make a clear choice about what we believe the 
world and human beings to be, while describing clearly the consequences of 
those choices. And although ultimately they choose radically opposed paths, in 
getting there they take the same uncompromising road. Our purpose then will be 
twofold: first to show that the question of being can only be avoided at the risk of 
compromising intellectual integrity. Secondly, to try to see on what basis we can 
choose between Nietzsche's vision of being as becoming, of willing as the only 
end, and Grant's vision of the eternal as unchanging goodness.
page 6
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CHAPTER TWO
Modernity
“ Nietzsche's words raise to an intensively full light of 
explicitness what it is to live in this era. He articulates 
what it is to  have inherited existence as a present 
member o f Western history. His thought does not 
invent the situation of contemporary existing; it 
unfolds it.” George Grant (TH, p.35)
Over the course of this thesis we will come to see that, athough they dis­
agree on most fundamentals, when it comes to describing the reality of existence 
in the modern world Nietzsche and Grant find themselves r  accord. That is 
exactly what makes comparing them such an interesting and challenging effort. 
Both Nietzsche and Grant yearn for something that they feel is absent from the 
modern world. In The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche laments the slumber of 
tragedy, of Dionysus, yet when he speaks of the overman he looks to the future 
not to the present to find him. Grant speaks of the darkness of modernity, and 
the fact that the Lord remains hidden behind necessity. Both speak of a crisis in 
modernity and in equally dramatic ways they make us come face to face with 
reality and with the choices we have to make.
The title of this chapter is a little misleading since in rearty the entirety of 
this essay is related in some way indirectly to the notion of beng. Nevertheless 
it is appropriate to start with the most salient points of Nietzsche’s and Grant's 
descriptions of modernity because it represents the starting point and the 
grounding of both their thoughts. Indeed their thinking was developed and influ-
page 7
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enced by the reality which they faced. I have chosen to examine both writings in 
turn, outlining first their thought and drawing out the similarities and differences 
of interest along the way, and bringing both together at the end of each chapter. 
Nietzsche comes first because Grant read and commented on Nietzsche exten­
sively, giving him an unfair advantage in what is shaping up to be a battle for our 
souls.
Nihilism and Decadence
Nihilism, for Nietzsche, is a word that describes in its essence the crisis 
from which the modem world is suffering - the devaluation of values. This deval­
uation has plunged humanity into the anguish of the absurd by imposing on all 
human beings the devastating certainty that things no longer have any sense.
This nihilism sanctions the generalization of a morbid phenomenon: deca­
dence. Insofar as it remains in certain social strata in specific regions of the 
globe, decadence is of no danger to civilization. When, however, it invades, as 
Nietzsche maintains, the majority of classes, institutions, and peoples, as to 
become identified with the very idea of humanity, it becomes a calamity, the tri­
umph of disease, disorganization and disgust with life. In speaking of deca­
dence, Nietzsche tries to regroup the existential conditions which prepared the 
way for the eruption of nihilism. Indeed, for him, nihilism is not the cause but the 
logical end of decadence.
Decadence is first characterized as the dissolution of instinct. In order to 
reestablish some balance, the decadent turns to reason, which he erects as a
page 8
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despot under cover of a moral imperative and a sectarian faith in logic. This 
medicine, however, does nothing to alter the fact that the decadent is essentially 
a reactive being. Decadence provokes the disintegration of forms, the loss of the 
capacity to assimilate and to synthesize, and the debilitation of the will as well as 
a chaotic outbreak of the passions. The decadent, instead of acting, ruminates 
old griefs and seeks to forget it all through artificial stimulants.
According to Nietzsche the spread of decadence is explained by the pro­
gressive domination of the weak over the the strong through a will to vengeance. 
In order to understand this we must know that for Nietzsche humanity can be 
separated into two types: the weak, those who developed and perpetuate slave- 
morality, and the strong, those who developed and perpetuate the master-morali- 
ty. Master-morality is a morality that creates values with an eye to plenitude and 
fulfillment. It is an affirmation of a power and happiness that overflow, combined 
with the conscience of a richness that wants to spread itself. It is, above all “a 
glorification of the se lf (BGE, #260). Slave-morality is essentially a utilitarian 
morality. It was conceived by beings who were oppressed, dependent, and 
uncertain and who considered with disfavor the “virtues" of the master and 
wished to convince themselves that the happiness of the master could not be 
real. Their revenge is to honor those qualities which will better the existence of 
those who suffer. They honor pity, altruism, patience, affection and humility.
The slave-morality is a decadent morality which was spread by the clergy 
through the control of education. This pedagogy of decadence, hidden behind 
the pretense of the betterment of morals, serves to domesticate, to transform 
passionate and energetic natures into docile and mediocre beasts of the flock.
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Christianity, with its ideology of sin, was perfectly suited for this task and it creat­
ed an inoffensive and feeble human being - the sinner.
The end of the reign of decadence and the eruption of nihilism coincide 
with the death of God. With the death of God falls the ideology which guaranteed 
the domination of decadence and the void which was hidden by it is revealed. 
This void is not an absolute void which is opposed to being, rather it is a void of 
values related to a normative interpretation of life. So the anguish of nihilism 
begins when " the highest values are losing their value. There is no bourn. There 
is no answer to the question:1 to what purpose?'" (Z, p.2).
Nietzsche hears hints that nihilism is at hand:
the evil slumbering in the heart of theoretical culture gradually 
begins to disquiet modem man, and makes him anxiously 
ransack the stores of his experience for means to avoid the 
danger, though not believing very much in these means... 
great, universally gifted natures have contrived, with an 
incredible amount of thought, to make use of the apparatus 
of science itself, in order to point out the limits and the 
relativity of knowledge generally, and thus definitely deny 
the claim of science to universal validity and universal ends( BT, #18).
The Last Men and the Overmen
When Zarathustra came down from his mountain after ten years of soli­
tude he met the hermit saint of the forest, who had retired far from men to wor­
ship God. The hermit had no doctrine; he did not address men; his existence as 
a hermit transcended the condition of ordinary men; and he felt closer to God 
through prayer, the dialogue of men with God. Seeing this Zarathustra asked 
himself, "Could it be possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it,
page 10
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that God is dead!" ( Z, p.6). Zarathustra is himself a hermit, but of necessity he 
came down from his mountain to address men because after the death of God 
men now address each other; they no longer invoke the gods or the saints; they 
invoke the possibility of the supreme being; the overman.
With the death of God Nietzsche proclaims the end of all idealism, the end 
of the idea that there is anything beyond man, the end of objective transcen­
dence. The death of God is the rock upon which Zarathustra builds his doctrine. 
But Nietzsche warns that this event is not without danger. God provided a bril­
liant horizon and with that gone humanity may well fall into a banal atheism and 
a vulgar moral depravation. While idealist tendencies diminish, life is demystified 
and rationalism and banality become the norm. Those who fall into this trap 
Nietzsche calls the last men and they are easily recognized as those who 
“...have their little pleasures for the day, and their little pleasures for the night: but 
they have a regard for health" (Z, p. 13). The last men are those who have lost 
all idealism, who have no hope of victory over themselves, who wish for nothing 
and strive for nothing because they have nothing to believe in, and they donl 
believe in themselves. In the last men the creative force of human nature has 
died, and despite his vast culture, the last man vegetates. His complacency, his 
notion of easy pleasures as happiness are his inoculation against despair and 
the abyss of existing. His recipe for happiness is the elimination of everything 
that is a source of tension, and for Nietzsche this means the elimination of tran­
scendence (the urge to surpass the self) and passage to passive nihilism.
But there will also be manifestations of active nihilism from those who will 
not be content to watch the downfall of the old ideals; they will feel that their last
page 11
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chance is to participate in their complete destruction. The full force of t h ^  Ener­
gies, fed by their rage against the void, will turn against the world and f^ V  will 
seek to destroy everything (WP, 1, #23).
Not all however will succumb to nihilism. With the advent of fV ilism  
comes the hope that it will be surpassed by an affirmative will to powef' \i/hich, 
against the void, will choose life. Looked at from this angle, nihilism app6^*s as 
the inevitable counterpart of a new and vigorous progression of humanity/ YOis in 
no way should be taken as an affirmation of Darwinism. Nietzsche makeg <^ uite 
clear that he considers such theories drivel, considering how often the and 
the mediocre win the struggle for life. What he wishes to make clear is ra t^ r  that 
the strong will make their way. With nihilism will come those, the O verm ^( who 
will forge a new idealism, an idealism that will not lose itself by worshippi^ that 
which it created as something outside of itself (transcendent) but wh'V1 will 
instead acknowledge its own creativity and use it to produce new ideals.
The Prologue in Thus Spoke Zarathoustra paints in large strokes t \  por­
trait of the Ubermensch as the one who is “ the meaning of the earth". ''^An is 
something that is to be surpassed,” (Z, p.6) but until now mankind has ^|Aays 
transcended itself by reaching for God. For Nietzsche, God is the sum tot^l £ f all 
transcendent ideals and in using Him, mankind has used and measuf'V the 
earth to embellish the image of the afterlife. The overman, who knows tb^t <aod 
is dead, meaning that a transcendental idealism has reached its end, rectf^izes 
in the afterlife the utopic reflection of the earth. He seeks to return to th^ ^Srth 
what was stolen from it, and establishes it as the counter-balance and the ^ i t  to 
all his projects, giving its existence meaning. Human freedom at its height no
V 9®13
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longer turned towards God, nor is it turned to the void, instead it is founded on 
the earth. "Once blasphemy against God was the greatest blasphemy; but God 
died, and therewith also those blasphemers. To blaspheme the earth is now the 
dreadfulest sin, and to rate the heart of the unknowable higher than the meaning 
of the earth!" (Z, p.7)
The main characteristic of the overman, however, is his Dionysian spirit. 
The Dionysian spirit symbolizes for Nietzsche a being who possesses such ener­
gy that it can transform everything into an affirmation: “The psychology of 
orgiasm conceived as the feeling of a superabundance of vitality and strength, 
within the scope of which even pain acts as a stimulus... the saying of Yea to life, 
including its most strange and most terrible problems, the will to life rejoicing 
over its own inexhaustibleness in the sacrifice of its highest types - that is what I 
call Dionysian “(Tl, p. 119).
The Dionysian spirit makes human beings better, stronger, meaner; it will 
define "a master race whose sole task is to rule, but a race with its own sphere 
of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the 
highest peak of the spirit; an affirming race that may grant itself every great luxu­
ry" (WP,4, # 898). Only them, only the "Dionysian God and man, cannot only 
afford the sight of the terrible and the questionable but even the terrible deed and 
any luxury of destruction, decomposition, and negation. In his case, what is evil, 
absurd, and ugly seems, as it were, permissible, owing to the excess of procreat­
ing, fertilizing energies that can still turn any desert into lush farmland" (GS, 
#370). Only they deserve to be the masters of the earth.
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Zarathustra knows without a doubt that "the good and the just would call 
his overman devil” (EH p.331), but what the virtuous are unable to understand is 
that collaboration between good and evil is necessary in the true creator. 
Zarathustra says that he knows only one thing, that '"man must become better 
and eviler* - so do I teach. The evilest is necessary for the Superman's best" (Z, 
p.353).
Finally the overman will be a fierce individualist. Nietzsche insists that it is 
the richness of personality, with its instinctual and pleasurable approval of itself 
which is capable of the greatest deeds. Such an individualism is the primary con­
dition to generosity in life and in knowledge. It also provokes the love of differ­
ence: ’’the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the 
formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive 
states, in short, just the elevation of the type 'man', the continued 'self-surmount­
ing of man'” (BGE, #257). This is one of the reasons why Nietzsche detests mod­
em egalitarianism; it is for him one more obstacle to the production of the over­
man, which if anything is an aristocrat. For him it is a fact of life that some are 
better than others, and if anything the distance between the classes must be 
larger, the superior race of men must hold itself apart if it is to make the sacri­
fices necessary to its existence.
In the eyes of the Ubermensch there is no already existent reality to which 
he must conform and integrate, his attitude in the face of the world is original, his 
will is such that he creates his own goals, his own values and gives new forms to 
human existence.
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Will to power
Why is Nietzsche so convinced that man is a being who surpasses him­
self? Because he recognizes in human beings the universal nature of life - the 
will to power. The will to power is one of the central themes in Nietzsche’s philos­
ophy because it is for him "the innermost essence of being’ (WP, 3, # 693). 
When the Ubermensch turns to the earth after the death of the transcendental 
ideal (God), he becomes a historical being, since by turning to the earth where 
all things reside he learns and understands his finite nature. His freedom as a 
creator is then expressed in a project aimed at future possibilities, finite possibili­
ties - by his willing. His drive to constantly surpass himself is no: an ascetic drive, 
hostile to the world, but the desire to surpass the finite goals which were set by 
his own will.
In order to fully understand Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power we have 
to start where he starts, and that is with the body. Indeed for him only the body 
can put us in a position where we can begin to decipher the world. He believes 
that each part of the body participates in all its activities, be it thinking, willing, or 
feeling. He speaks of the body as a 'self', as a splendid cohesion of individual 
activities, so that superior and inferior activities adjust and relate to each other in 
order that “wherever we see or divine movement in a body, we learn to conclude 
that there is a subjective invisible life appertaining to it. Movement is symbolism 
for the eye; it indicates that something has been felt, willed, thought" (WP, 3, 
#492). For Nietzsche taking the body as our guide lets us recognize in human 
beings a plurality of organic beings who, fighting or submitting, affirm them­
selves individually while involuntarily affirming the whole so that in the end har-
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mony and balance are reached and maintained only through struggle and victo­
ry. The body is a unity of individuals who treat each other as equals, as in any 
aristocracy (BGE, #259). This totality of organic qualities which man consists of 
remains for the most part in our unconscious and those qualities which are trans­
lated through our consciousness present themselves as instincts. On the vigor­
ousness of these instincts depends the aptitudes of each person, and for 
Nietzsche "genius resides in instinct; goodness likewise. One acts perfectly 
when one acts instinctively “ (WP, 2, #440). Indeed for him it can be proven that 
thinking which goes on at a conscious level is inferior to thinking which lets itself 
be guided by instinct. That is why the decadent is an infirm when it comes to 
instincts; he tries to mask the disease by using his conscience and his reason to 
develop a morality which will make up for his debilitated instincts.
The body leads us inevitably towards the idea of the will to power, and 
from the body Nietzsche extends the will to power to be inclusive to all things. 
When he says "the essence of the world is Will to Power" (BGE, #186) o r " The 
essence of life is Will to Power" (GM, #12), world, life, body, are not ultimate 
things but formations of the Will to Power.
The first clue to understanding the Will to Power is the idea of struggle 
which was revealed by the analysis of the body. The idea of struggle as funda­
mental came to Nietzsche from the Greeks who saw combat as the continuous 
action of a coherent and severe justice linked to eternal ends. As we have seen, 
Nietzsche saw this same struggle (without the eternal ends) in the qualities of 
the body . Moreover the Greeks, starting with Homer and followed by Hesiod 
(1) A.H.J. Knight, Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, p. 144.
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and Heraclitus, fixed the model for the spiritualization of strugc e by acknowledg­
ing that culture cannot exist without a large capital of powerful nstincts which we 
have learned to control and channel into creativity. Thus corcetition animated 
every aspect of Greek public life, from competitions, to public debates, to rival 
philosophical doctrines. The overman is, according to A.H.J. Knight in Some 
Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, modeled on the early Greek whose 
ideal is "of physical beauty, power, and success...and who is arything rather than 
humane sympathetic or unselfish" (1). This ideal, together wldi his discoveries 
about the body, drive Nietzsche to say that all living beings struggle under the 
rules of combat, and that things themselves, which our limited intelligence sees 
as solid and constant, don't really exist: " they are as the sta-s of Victory rising 
with a radiant resplendence in the battle of the opposite qualities" (EGP, p. 102).
Living then means destroying as much as creating, h-rting, fighting the 
weak and the strange, oppressing others so that we can then impose on them 
our own forms. ’"Exploitation' does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and 
primitive society: it belongs to the nature of living being as a primary organic 
function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the 
Will to Life" ( BGE, #259).
Life itself is a struggle, not for survival in the Darwinian sense, but for 
power. Nor should the idea of power be seen as the domination of others; 
Nietzsche defines it as the domination of the self through the esthetic sublima­
tion of instincts so that it has no relation to the barbaric violence of vulgar and 
mediocre individuals. " Life, as the form of being most familiar to us, is specifi­
cally a will to the accumulation of force; all the processes of life depend on this:
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nothing wants to presen/e itself, everything is to be added and accumulated. Life 
as a special case strives after a maximal feeling of power; essentially a striving 
for more power; striving is nothing other than striving for power; the basic and 
innermost thing is still this will " (WP, 3, #689). Here we see the idea of power 
and the idea of force mixed together. The two are indeed very similar and it 
seems as though Nietzsche only separates them to define the will to power 
quantatively. Nietzsche will later build an entire cosmology around the notion, the 
varying degrees of energy will be will to power.
We should take care not to interpret the Will to Power solely in a psycho­
logical manner (even though Nietzsche himself sometimes does this) which 
would equate it with a hunger for power according to which individuals would 
desire to dominate and subjugate. Such an interpretation would show a will 
which in reality is impotent and suffering from inadequacy, since for Nietzsche 
the Will to Power is ultimately an affirmation of the earth.
Nor should we think of distinguishing between will and power since the 
two terms are inseparable, each term taking on a new meaning in conjunction 
with the other. In the case of the will, we should no longer think of it in the classi­
cal sense as a metaphysical substance or a faculty of the subject. Indeed in an 
effort to undermine this classical conception of the will, Nietzsche says “there is 
no such thing as will" (WP, 3, #488). What he is denying is that there exists a 
unique and universal will, permanent and identical from which an individual's 
actions originate. That there is no will means that there is no fixed and defined 
center but rather a plurality of elementary wills, or unconscious impulses, forever 
in conflict. For Nietzsche to will is to feel the triumph of a force that has cleared a
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way for itself without our always being conscious of it, anc t is an illusion to 
believe that this feeling is a free causality. Instead of being a beginning, the will, 
like consciousness itself, is an end, the distant echo of a batt a Jought in the code 
language of subconscious impulses. Control of these subconscious impulses 
then becomes a political matter. The clue to this code language is the body, 
which explains once again why Nietzsche uses it as his guide.
For Nietzsche "life is just a special case of the Will tz Power" ( WP, 3, 
#692), be it in the organic world as impulse, instinct or need, cr in the psycholog­
ical realm as desire, motivation or idea. Taken in its widest sarse 'Will to Power' 
is a deployment of forces that is never finalized but always oriented. It is a 
movement toward power which propels the will to will its ovr growth so that its 
alternatives are clear, either to grow and surpass itself, or to cecline and degen­
erate.
The modern paradigm of knowledge
Grant's thinking about modernity is not original. He has taken up and 
rearticulated the insights of such diverse thinkers as Nietzsche, Weber, 
Heidegger, Jacques Ellul and Leo Strauss in his efforts to describe the reality we 
face. What is original is the fact that his efforts are clearly oriented by a desire to 
understand modernity in cpnjunction with the truths of classical philosophy and 
revelation. A hard task indeed, since by his own admission much of these truths 
have become obscured not only in the very way we think but in our language as 
well.
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The way we think in the modem world, according to Grant, is shaped by 
our paradigm of knowledge. "The principle of any paradigm in any civilization is 
always the relation between the aspiration of human thought and the effective 
conditions for its validation" (TJ, p.36). The relation between aspiration and 
effective conditions in modem western civilization is given in the modem use of 
the word 'technology', and it finds its expression in the language of objectivity. 
The paradigm of knowledge is the project of reason to gain objective knowledge. 
The term object, taken from its Latin roots, means something we throw over 
against ourselves. Reason, as the project, what is thrown forth, is the summon­
ing of something before us and the putting of questions to it so that it will give us 
its reasons for being the way it is. When we have done this we believe we have 
knowledge. This summoning and questioning is done in modern sciences 
through well-defined procedures of experimentation and observation.
Grant suggests that the aspiration behind the paradigm can be found in 
the impetus towards making which is reflected primarily in physics, the effective 
conditions for its realization being the mathematical representation of the world. 
Not being a scientist, Grant can only hint at this in his writing, but he finds that 
the same ideas can be expressed in an analysis of technology.
He points out that technology puts together the Greek words techne and 
logos, which are basically the equivalent for art and for systematic study, so that 
"'technology' is used to describe the actual means of making events happen and 
not simply the systematic study of these means, [and] the word reveals to us the 
fact that these new events happen because we westerners willed to develop a 
new and unique co-penetration of the arts and sciences, a co-penetration that
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has never before existed" (TJ, p. 12). Indeed a transformation has taken place in 
our arts and sciences which cannot be simply accounted for as an extension of 
human making through a science that has perfected itself over the centuries. 
While it is true that other civilizations such as the ancient Greeks did not have at 
their disposal a knowledge of physics that enabled them to harness the forces of 
nature, we should not let this hinder our understanding of the modem technologi­
cal enterprise as a novelty. We are faced with a new account of knowing and 
making in which these two activities are changed by their co-penetration.
The division between applied arts and fine arts for instance indicates well 
how the Greek differentiation between arts and science according to their differ­
ent objects has been eroded today. Applied arts being those which are co-pene- 
trated with science, and fine arts those which are not. To define technology, as 
does the Oxford dictionary, as ‘"the scientific study of the practical arts'", is mis­
leading, since this "does not make clear that technologies arise not from the sci­
entific study of the arts which leaves them systematized but essentially 
unchanged, but rather by the penetration of the arts by discoveries of science 
which changes those arts in their very essence" (KM, p.63). Medicine is one 
example of an art which was transformed by science, in this instance by chem­
istry.
When we differentiate between theoretical and applied sciences, Grant 
reminds us that we do not do so in the same way the ancients did. To illustrate 
this Grant uses the atomic bomb and the computer as examples. Einstein, he 
reminds us, advised Roosevelt that developments in modem physics made it 
possible to build atomic weapons and that the Americans should do so. Physics
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here was 'applied' in deciding American interests. It was applied ('folded 
towards') in its literal sense as well in “the very discoveries of science [which] 
were in their essence folded towards the mastery of the energies of nature in a 
way that was absent in the pre-modem sciences" (TJ, p. 14).
Grant's example using computers is built around the phrase " the comput­
er does not impose on us the ways it should be used" (TJ, p.21). He starts out by 
outlining that the person who made this statement saw computers as machines, 
or instruments, with certain capacities, built by human beings who operate them 
according to purposes they have determined. Implied in the phrase is the com­
mon sense assertion that "we have certain technological capacities; it is up to us 
to use those capacities for decent purposes" (TJ, p.21). Yet the statement 
obscures, as Grant points out, what computers really are because it abstracts 
from the capabilities of the computer all the events which have made its exis­
tence possible. The computer does not exist in a vacuum; it came to be out of a 
particular cultural, scientific and philosophic context which required chemists, 
metallurgists, mine and factory workers as well as a highly developed electronics 
industry, and the existence of modem algebra combined with the drive to use 
modem algebra in understanding nature. In other words the phrase “misleads, 
because it abstracts the computer from the destiny which was required for its 
making. Common sense may tell us that the computer is an instrument, but it is 
an instrument from within the destiny which does 'impose' itself upon us, and 
therefore the computer does impose" (TJ, p.23).
This 'civilizational destiny' consists of the fundamental presuppositions inherited 
by the majority of us, namely the paradigm of knowledge which Grant is describ­
ing. "Our paradigm of knowledge is the very heart of this civilization's destiny,
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and such destinies have a way of working themselves out - that is, of bringing 
forth from their principle everything which is implied in that principle" (KM, p.67).
What the co-penetration of the arts and sciences brings to light is that in 
these "new ways of making the giving of reasons.... come from modem science" 
(KM, p.63). Grant makes it clear that what comes forth from modem science is 
the appearance of nature as blind contingency. Science and art were considered 
by the Greeks to be concerned with distinct realms of being; techne (or art) being 
concerned with what might or might not be, namely with what is accidental, 
whereas episteme ( or science) was concerned with what was necessary. In our 
modern paradigm of knowledge both arts and sciences are concerned with con­
tingent events, with the realm of chance. So the discoveries of science make the 
world available to us in a new way, a way in which the very nature of knowledge 
leads to new technologies. This is made even more obvious when the response 
to a crisis caused by technology is to invent new technologies which will resolve 
it. Again the computer demonstrates for us just how technology creates its own 
impetus. Anyone who owns a computer knows how quickly this technology is 
changing; my own computer, barely four years old, is already considered obso­
lete, too old and too slow to accept the new software and hardware which is 
being created for better, that is, bigger and faster computers.
When Grant asks " was there some originating affirmation made some­
where and sometime when Europeans defined themselves over against the clas­
sical civilization they were inheriting?" (TJ, p. 18), he is asking what it is that 
brought about the co-penetration of the arts and sciences. And although he 
answers the question, he warns that any attempt to understand "what is 'before'
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technology, leaves one only with dim and uncertain language' (TJ, p.18). His 
answer is that a primal affirmation penetrated the life and thought of westerners 
in the form of the apprehension of the whole as will. He adds that that apprehen­
sion came to Europeans "as they tried to relate what had been given in ancient 
philosophy to the exclusivity which they had taken from the Bible * (TJ, p.18).
It is clear that Grant believes, as Nietzsche did, that the will has become 
primal. Willing, he says "is that power of determining by which we put our stamp 
on events (including ourselves) and in which we do some violence to the world" 
(TH, p.22). Grant describes the modem 'language of willing' as a universal lan­
guage describing a universal aspect of modem life, namely the 'determination' to 
doing. This language is modern because although "Greek heroes were sum­
moned to be resolute for noble doing... their deeds were not thought of as 
changing the very structure of what is, but as done rather for the sake of bringing 
into immediacy the beauty of a trusted order, always there to be appropriated 
through whatever perils" (TH, p. 24). The difference between our willing and 
theirs is that they regarded theirs as obedient to a structured order, whereas we 
consider our willing, as Nietzsche has already said, as creative of a new order.
Willing has become primal because, in the absence of God, westerners 
have generally come to define themselves as self-created. Since we no longer 
believe that there is an eternal, transcendent, unchangeable good for which men 
are fitted, it is easy for us to understand ourselves in terms of creative freedom. 
Grant sees this manifested in the way we posit our own values, in our calculat­
ing and manipulated knowing through representation and experiment, in the way 
we strive to make events, to realize possibilities, and in our fascination with nov-
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elty. This reality is very clearly part of what Nietzsche had in mind when he pro­
claimed the death of God and the coming of the overman.
But if we go back to our example of computers, one of the things Grant 
wishes to underline is that the existence of computers was made possible by 
understanding reason itself in a new way, as an instrument. That change was 
brought about first by Kant who conceived of human beings as free and 
autonomous in a subjective world so that they became makers of their own laws. 
"Kant's dictum that 'the mind makes the object' were the words of blessing spo­
ken at that wedding of knowing and production" (ESJ, p.1).
And, Grant goes on to say, "The word 'instrument' is not confined simply 
to external objects such as machines or drugs or hydro power, but includes such 
developments of systems of organization and communication as bureaucracies 
and factories. Technology is then thought of as the whole apparatus of instru­
ments made by man and placed at the disposal of man for his choice and pur­
poses" (TJ, p.19). We have already seen how this view of technology, for all its 
common sense, has revealed itself to be simplistic. It does not take into account 
how the two parts of the phrase "the computer does not impose on us" and "the 
ways it should be used" belie each other. The phrase expresses the externality 
and neutrality of the computer as an instrument, and it would have us believe in 
a view of the world in which neutral instruments are subject to the decisions of 
humans beings. Grant reminds us that the historical totality which the computer 
belongs to is suppressed in that phrase.
For Grant the novelty of modem instrumentality lies in its homogenizing
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thrust. Even if we grant that how the computer’s c£b£cities should be used is 
decided outside itself, we cannot deny that these capacities limit the kind of ways 
it can be used. What the computer does is to abstract facts so that they can be 
stored as information. This classification is by its very h£ture homogenizing since 
it reduces differences to sameness. "Indeed the worcj 'information' is itself per­
fectly attuned to the account of knowledge which is homogenizing in its very 
nature. 'Information' is about objects, and comes fohh as part of that science 
which summons objects to give us their reasons" (TJ, b.-24).
Nor is this homogenizing process limited to modern instrumentality. It 
impregnates modern political life as well, since it too is subject to this new 
account of reason in which knowing and making ara interpenetrated. Tangible 
evidence of this is found in the disappearance of pluralism. "As for pluralism, dif­
ferences in the technological state are able to exist only in private activities: how 
we eat, how we mate; how we practice ceremonies. Some like pizza, some like 
steaks, some like girls, some like boys; some like th^ synagogue, some like 
mass. But we all do it in churches, motels, restaurants indistinguishable from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific " (TE, p.26).
Grant brings this to light in his analysis of the 'should' in the phrase 'the 
computer does not impose on us the ways it should be used’; indeed 'should' in 
that sentence expresses that we ought to use the conribUter justly. Yet 'should', in 
the traditional sense, implies owing, which originally fit within the classical 
account of goodness as "that which meets us with the overriding claim of justice, 
and persuades us that in desiring obedience to that ci^im we will find what we 
are fitted for" (TJ, p.30). Today that ‘should* is shrouded in ambiguity; to whom
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and what do we owe anything? The modem conception of goodness, because of 
the modem experience of reason, has excluded from its account all owing. 
Goodness is “our free creating of richness and greatness of life and all that is 
advantageous thereto” (TJ, p.30) - this account of goodness is brought to life in 
the popular phrase 1 quality of life'. It does not include any assertion of a claim 
made upon us which would order our desires in terms of owing, rather "owing is 
always provisional upon what we desire to create."
At this point Grant's description of modernity is closest to Nietzsche's con­
cept of the will to power: it evokes images of the overman as Nietzsche 
described him, and recalls to us our opening quote: "His [Nietzsche's] thought 
does not invent the situation of contemporary existing: it unfolds it" (TH, p.35). In 
Grant's eyes the 'does not impose' in the sentence about the computer, however 
misguided it is, summons us to "resolute mastery" , to “freely create values" and 
"to make happen what we want to make happen" (TJ, p.31). So much so that it 
seems as though when Nietzsche said “Their 'knowing is creating, their creating 
is a law-giving, their will to truth is - will to power" (BGE, #211) he was talking 
about us....
Modern Liberalism
"During this century western civilization has speeded its worldwide influ­
ence through the universal acceptance of its technology" (ESJ, p.1). This techno­
logical civilization, by bringing together 'techne' and 'logos' or making and know­
ing, has exerted its universalizing and homogenizing influence throughout the 
world. In his critique of modem progressive liberalism, Grant shows the close
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relation between the development of technology and political liberalism. Indeed it 
is not by accident that advocates of that liberalism have almost always tied the 
possibility of realizing a truly liberal society to the potentialities of modem tech­
nology. For Grant, that close interdependence is most obvious “in the way that 
some convinced modem liberals put forth their creed as if it were a product of 
modem science itself; that is, speaking about it in the very language of objectivity 
which is appropriate to scientific discoveries, but not to an account of the political 
good" (ESJ, p.3). It follows that the account of reason, as discussed earlier, 
which resulted in the discoveries of science found itself expressed in political 
regimes congruent with liberalism.
When he speaks of modem liberalism, Grant reminds us that at its best it 
has “been much more than a justification of progress in the mastery of human 
and non-human nature. [It has] affirmed that any regime to be called good, and 
any progress to be called good, must include political liberty and consent" (ESJ, 
p.5). The majority of people in the west today are still being given at the centre of 
their education the belief that the modern liberal account of justice, with its 
emphasis on the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, is the best 
account.
Still, in the midst of these good intentions and high ideals Grant asks 
“What were the modem assumptions which at one and the same time exalted 
human freedom and encouraged that cybernetic mastery which now threatens 
freedom?" (ESJ, p. 10). With this question Grant opens up two avenues of dis­
cussion which are central to his discussion of modem liberalism. The first sug­
gests that technological development, although it developed in tandem with liber-
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alism, does not ultimately sustain it. Here Grant is inspired by Heidegger who 
described how modem sciences increasingly organize themselves around cyber­
netics and the mastery of human beings. Without going into great detail about 
why this happened it is still easy to see how technology has been organized 
around a system engaging a massive apparatus of artisans concerned with 
behavior modification, genetic engineering, and population control by abortion, to 
cite only a few examples. This apparatus (in the form of giant corporations) 
reaches out to control more and more lives. In light of these developments it is 
indeed timely to ask whether the institutions of free politics and the protection of 
the rights of the individual can be maintained.
Grant's answer is that this massive apparatus has already undermined the 
fabric of our free society. The great founders of our liberalism believed that all 
members of society should have a say in the governing of society. They also 
hoped that our individuality would be expressed in our work as the field of our 
choices, and that the overcoming of the division of labor would result in that indi­
viduality being expressed in a variety of equal work . Instead, most of our work 
has become highly specialized and involves a routine which has little do to with 
individuality or spontaneity. Moreover, the modem individual concentrates on pri­
vate life, and retreats from the public realm as something external. There exists 
as well a growing perception that governments have less and less constitutive 
authority in the face of the decisions of giant corporations, which takes us far 
away from the liberal ideal of autonomous and equal human beings participating 
in the government and in the production of society.
The second avenue opened by Grant's question concerns those modem
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assumptions “which at one and the same time exalted human freedom and 
encouraged that cybernetic mastery which now threatens freedom" (ESJ, p. 10). 
The assumptions are that human beings created themselve: that they take 
responsibility for their essence; that there is no inherent justice in things to which 
human beings must conform; there exists no eternal law by which we are mea­
sured and defined; that everything is radically contingent; and that the meaning 
of beings is to be found in their finite possibilities. The main thrust of these 
assumptions is that our changing views of man and the cosmos need not affect 
the content of justice in our societies, yet the 'should' in Grants analysis of the 
computer, implies that it already has.
The traditional view of justice, which came forth out of western philosophy 
and Christianity, is ' that justice is the overriding order which we do not measure 
and define, but in terms of which we are measured and defined" (ESJ, p.74). 
The modem view of justice is that it is " a way which we choose in freedom, both 
individually and publicly, once we have taken our fate into our hands, and know 
that we are responsible for what happens in a world governed by necessity and 
chance which we view as raw material " (ESJ, p.74). According to Grant a con­
tradiction arose in western civilization when human beings tried to hold onto cer­
tain aspects of justice which came from the old account even while they no 
longer used that old account of good to understand the way things are. This 
desire to maintain the contents of good and justice while embracing a new way 
of looking at the world (being) can be found in the attempts at practical and theo­
retical reconciliation and in the accounts of contractualist justice from Locke to
Rawls. That is why such accounts have often been referred to as secularized
(2) Louis Greenspan, The unraveling of liberalism, in George Grant and the 
Subversion of Modernity, p. 209.
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Christianity.
Here again Grant is close to Nietzsche, who said " The masses blink and 
say: ‘We are all equal. - Man is but man, before God - we are all equal.' Before 
God! But now this God has died" (Z, p.5), thus ridiculing the liberals of his time 
for trying to maintain a content to justice and truth and goodness, when these 
notions had died with God. The only difference between Grant and Nietzsche 
here is that the situation which Grant faced is one in which God's death has been 
widely acknowledged. In an analysis of Rawls' contractualism, Grant stresses 
that what Nietzsche said a hundred years ago about liberalism still applies today. 
For Grant, Rawls is just the last in a long line of “intellectual democrats who 
adopt modem thought while picking and choosing among the ethical 'norms' of a 
dead past" (ESJ, p.77). These moralists point to the fact that moral rules are 
useful conventions, and that the core of our social justice is convenient and can 
be maintained in the interests of property , equality and liberty. What that justice 
lost of its justification in terms of eternity, they replace by the social contract.
In his critique of Rawls, Grant points out however that even in contractual 
ethics the ontological questions cannot be avoided forever. The abortion debate 
is a perfect example. In declaring abortion legal, our justice system made a judg­
ment about the foetus - that it is not a person. The mother is a person, the foetus 
is not; this is an ontological distinction, not a scientific one. "But once ontological 
affirmation is made the basis for denying the most elementary right of traditional 
justice to members of our species, ontological questions cannot be silenced at 
this point. Because such a distinction between members of the same species 
has been made, the decision opens up the whole question of what it is our
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species is. What is it about any members of our species which makes the liberal 
rights of justice their due? " (ESJ, p.71). This is the question which Rawls and 
modem liberalism generally is unable to answer because of their assumptions 
about being. Louis Greenspan, in ‘The Unravelling of Liberalism', has difficulty 
seeing why the question of personhood is the cup of poison to the lips of liberal­
ism. He believes that Grant's questions "are well within the cannon of liberalism"
(2) In this he has misunderstood Grant's critique of modem liberalism which is 
above all an indictment of its assumptions about being as nothing but necessity 
and chance. Grant feels that this leads to the emancipation of human beings 
from the realm of nature, free to define themselves. Within such a context it is 
impossible to define positivively what a person is. The example of abortion 
proves this point as the judgment rendered by the justice system is negative — 
stating that the foetus is not a person. The same justice system cannot, however, 
without jeopardizing its own claims to universality, positively define what a per­
son is.
Conclusion
Nietzsche's challenge to modem human beings is to overcome the civi- 
lizational contradiction manifest in modem liberalism by developing an account 
of justice which is in line with our technological possibilities. Grant's critique of 
liberalism comes with the realization that Nietzsche's challenge is being met by 
those who believe that "the production of quality of life requires a legal system 
which gives new range to the rights of the creative and the dynamic." Grant is 
here referring to legal decisions concerning abortion and euthanasia, and to the 
fact that there is no longer any reason why the range of the rights of the creative
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should be limited by those "who are too weak to enforce contracts, namely • the 
imprisoned, the mentally unstable, the unborn, the aged, the defeated and some­
times even the morally unconforming" (ESJ, p.84). For him Nietzsche’s challenge 
has been taken up and what he called for is coming to pass. Even if it was not 
done consciously, our justice is being remade according to our vision of nature 
as potential raw material, to be disposed of by our creative wills.
Grant effectively points out how our justice has indeed shifted to a low­
ered content of equal liberty. His wish is that we confront Nietzsche's challenge 
directly not by seeing what is happening as new practical difficulties for liberalism 
arising from the need to control new technologies external to that liberalism. 
Rather we must become aware that contractual liberalism is not independent of 
the assumptions behind technology in a way which would enable that liberalism 
to be a means of transcending those technologies. He warns that the injustices 
of modem technological society will not be recognized by the majority because 
for them justice is summed up in the "external conveniences of contract” (ESJ 
84), and justified by reason as the instrument of our obvious interests.
Both Nietzsche and Grant tell us that we must make choices about what 
we believe the world to be and that these choices must be made in the absence 
of all safety nets. These two thinkers challenge us to be intellectually honest in a 
way most modem philosophers fail to do. We have seen that one of the things 
they have in common with regard to modernity is their condemnation of modem 
liberalism. For Nietzsche the liberals are the last men, those who will accept that 
God is dead because it makes them free to create a world which suits them but 
who refuse to give up the old value system that went with it, settling instead com-
pagesa
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fortably in incoherence. The liberal assumptions as Grant sees them are, briefly, 
that human beings create themselves freely, that they take responsibility for their 
essence, that there is no inherent justice in things to which human beings must 
conform, no eternal law by which we are measured and defined, that everything 
is radically contingent, and that the meaning of beings is to be found in their finite 
possibilities. Holding to this dramatically different view of being in the modem 
world without admitting that the contents of justice and the political good are fun­
damentally changed is what both Nietzsche and Grant declare to be impossible.
Why is it impossible? Because that which enables us to define ourselves 
as radically free is an image of the world as an accidental conglomeration of 
matter with no meaning other than what we give to it, which also forces us to the 
logical conclusion that this world has no other meaning or value than what we 
impose upon it. And what then of justice? Well at the very least this eliminates 
the idea of inalienable rights. Indeed, what rights does matter have? And what 
are we but accidental conglomerations of matter that act and think?
Even though they agree that the liberal position is untenable and incoher­
ent, Nietzsche and Grant ultimately respond to correct its incoherence in very dif­
ferent ways. Nietzsche would have us remain with the new vision of the world 
which enables us to define ourselves as radically free but with the idea that we 
must transcend good and evil. Grant would affirm that we are not the measure of 
all things, God is, and justice lives. Faced with these uncompromising and com­
pelling positions ( which we will explore in more detail in the chapters to come), I 
am reminded of two phrases. The first is an old Spanish proverb that Grant has 
used: “Take what you want, said God. Take it and pay for it.” This is the critical 
point shared by Grant and Nietzsche: make your choice and accept all that it
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entails. It can be said that modem liberalism has made its choice, it has accept­
ed that God is dead, but it has -ot accepted all that that entails, the death of the 
distinction between good and e.il. The second phrase is from T.S. Eliot’s poem 
The Lovesong of J. Alfred Pnr'oclc “Do I dare eat a peach?" To which many 
modem thinkers I believe quiet/ answer “no" for fear that the juice will drip down 
their chins and perhaps onto their cardigans.
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CHAPTER 3
History
“A historical phenomenon, completely understood 
and reduced to an item of knowledge, is, in relation 
to the man who knows it, dead....”
Nietzsche (UAH, p. 11)
The question of history is a complex one as it not only brings into question 
the study of the past as a fountain of knowledge but it also speaks to a certain 
kind of reality - human existence in the world. Throughout the ages human 
beings have tried to understand the temporality in their lives because so much of 
what has been dictates what will be. Grant and Nietzsche help us to be clear 
about where we stand on history by describing to us what it means to be a his­
torical being. Each has a different take on history, yet both view the question of 
history as a whole, that is as a question which goes to the very core of who and 
what we are, of how we define ourselves and our purposes, and of where we fit 
in the world. In the process they show how closely related are the questions of 
being and of history, and how the former largely depends on the latter.
The historical sense
For Nietzsche, the historical sense is the outcome of centuries of 
Christianity, as is the pursuit of truth by science which itself blossomed from the 
long history of truth seeking in Christianity. Of course Nietzsche viewed 
Christianity as “Platonism for the people" (BGE, #2), in that it took over the 
Platonic identification of rationality, virtue and happiness, uniting it with the idea 
of equality. The belief that this unity was grounded in God soon gave way to a 
secularized version which Nietzsche called the height of optimism, since the lib-
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erals who proclaimed it believed that it was coming to be here on earth. For 
Nietzsche, of course, this is also the height of contradiction. The positive by­
product, for Nietzsche, of this process was the development of a historical 
sense.
Historical sense is, for Nietzsche, ultimately what results of the belief that 
becoming is the rule; it is the finality of becoming, which in the end undercuts all 
philosophical definition and generalization. Historical sense shows the shallow­
ness of historical hope and liberal morality; it denies all attempts to view history 
teleologically as showing the growing power of rationality in the human species. 
Indeed the very values of rationality and purpose are intelligible only within a 
‘horizon’ which the historical sense has revealed as a horizon. Horizon is a term 
Nietzsche uses to describe the presuppositions within which individuals do their 
living: they are the limits within which everything appears, and they condition 
human action in so far as they define its ends. The historical sense reveals these 
horizons as man-made perspectives, creations of our tortured instincts. 
Nietzsche is aware that by unveiling our horizons as horizons (of which 
Nietzsche hoped God was the last) he is plunging human willing into a crisis (out 
of which he hopes will come new brighter horizons), for how can we keep on will­
ing when our ends have been shown to be nothing more than fabrication?
First let us consider how Nietzsche views history. For Nietzsche, human 
beings do not remain identical to themselves, they are what they are through 
their history, and that history maintains them in perpetual motion. In order to 
understand how he sees history and its role, it is essential to know that for 
Nietzsche there is no finality in the world, everything is constantly moving, and 
changing. There is being, but being is becoming. It is in this context that he con-
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ceives of the laws which govern history. These laws are not absolute. Rather 
they are seen by Nietzsche as sociological necessities and psychological types 
of conduct in a plenitude of unlimited historical manifestations. These laws are 
an effort to get at what is behind those immediate manifestations.
History begins for Nietzsche with the individual’s creative desire for free­
dom. The pre-historic, as seen by him, was determined by a tradition which dom­
inated and which no one questioned. Nothing happened in those immense 
spaces of time which precede universal history. Nonetheless these periods of 
time are “the actual and decisive eras of history which determined the character 
of mankind” (Aurora, #18).
These historical eras fixed the character of humanity in that it was then 
that human beings constituted themselves as moral. Nietzsche describes how 
the most horrible thing that could happen to human beings in those times was to 
be alone. Being an individual was not a pleasure but a punishment, and solitude 
meant all sorts of miseries and fears. What was most prevalent then was the 
herd mentality, and whenever this herd instinct was translated into action by the 
individual, the more that individual considered himself to be moral.
What brought about the beginning of history was the break with tradition. 
In that sense history is a result of the tension between the individual and obliga­
tion to the group, and is always bom of free thinkers. In the face of tradition, 
however, free thinkers are always weak, and the only remedy for that is in the 
cult of genius and the cult of culture. If we hold those things in the highest
esteem then we are in no danger of sinking once again into the nothingness of
(3) See A.H. J. Knight Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche for a 
good analysis of the influence of the early Greeks on Nietzsche.
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prehistoric tradition and the core of all that is human will not be bst (BGE,#32).
The course of history shows us, according to Nietzsche, trie domination of 
human beings by metaphysical, religious and moral errors which have made us 
forget our beginnings as savage, deregulated forces of nature. When we con- 
template those beginnings: “we behold in that other zone how the most raging 
passions are brought down and destroyed by the uncanny force of metaphysical 
conceptions” (HATH, # 236). But the transformation of this becoming was pre­
supposed in the very occurrences of these errors: “It seems that, in order to 
inscribe themselves in the hearts of humanity with eternal demands, all great 
things have first to wander the earth as monstrous and fear-inspiring grotesques: 
dogmatic philosophy, the doctrine of the Vedanta and Platonism in Europe for 
example, was a grotesque of this kind....we whose task is wakefulness itself 
have inherited all the strength which has been cultivated by the struggle against 
this error” (BGE, preface).
Nietzsche sees at work in history powerful forces that remain the same, 
however they be masked by human beings. Culture is just the mask which cov­
ers these chaotic forces responsible for all beginnings: “the most savage forces 
beat a path, and are mainly destructive....The frightful energies - those which are 
called evil - are the cyclopean architects and road-makers of humanity ” (HATH, 
#246). So much so that Nietzsche affirms that all high culture originates from 
barbarism, even though these things remain hidden. Even today, terrible things 
continue to happen, but they too are hidden because “Multiplicities are invented 
in order to do things for which the individual lacks courage. It is for just this rea­
son that all commonalities and societies are a hundred times more upright and 
instructive about the nature of man than is the individual” (WP, 3.# 716).
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Nietzsche, despite his training as a philologist, is not a specialized 
researcher following a methodology. Nor is he a philosopher v.ho expresses his 
historical sense in an ordered ensemble. He is rather a fervent observer and 
commentator of the images of becoming, motivated by a will to knowledge. 
Although his eyes have roamed through and observed the essential characteris­
tics of primitives times, Antiquity, India, Christianity, the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment, and modem times, his evaluation remains cen­
tered on pre-Socratic Greek culture as the crucial point in history. It is against the 
early Greeks that he measures all other human beings. (3) Indeed, for 
Nietzsche, history, properly done, can bring back those characteristics of early 
Greek society which he so prized, in a rejuvenation conjurea in many ways by 
the historical sense.
Historical sense is so important to Nietzsche because without it human 
beings cease to be human beings. Moreover without historical sense they can’t 
remember or know what it is that has been and can be great about them. In out­
lining what the historical sense is Nietzsche describes the essence of human 
beings as he sees them. The difference between human beings and animals is 
an effect of history, of unconscious tradition and conscious remembrance. 
Human beings only notice their changing form in that they remember what and 
where they were and are able to detach themselves from that past, knowing that 
there is a future. Men are different from beast in that "the beast lives unhistorical- 
ly; for it goes into the present, like a number, without leaving any conscious 
remainder. It cannot dissimulate, it conceals nothing; at every moment it seems 
what it actually is, and thus can be nothing that is not honest' (UAH, p.5). Men 
however have discovered themselves to be historical beings. As such they need
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history to acquire, thanks to the great examples of what was possible in the past, 
the courage necessary for that action which will make them surpass themselves, 
as well as for consolation when times are desperate.
Moreover history, for Nietzsche, is supposed to serve life. The knowledge 
of the past is desired only for the service of the future and the present, not to 
weaken the present or undermine a living future" (UAH, p.22). History is neces­
sary to human beings in three ways: as a guide for action, as a means of preser­
vation and reverence, and to alleviate his suffering. Nietzsche identifies three 
kinds of history which correspond to these needs: monumental, antiquarian, and 
critical (UAH, p. 12).
Monumental history serves the man of action in that it provides examples, 
teachers, and comforters. It is looking to the past for those great moments which 
provide the high road for humanity through the ages as inspiration for today’s 
struggles. It reflects a fundamental belief in humanity which is awakened in 
human beings when they look to past greatest. They are strengthened by looking 
at it "as though man’s life were a lordly thing, and the fairest fruit of this bitter tree 
were the knowledge that there was once a man who walked sternly and proudly 
through this world" (UAH, p. 13). But the monumental method presents a danger 
because as a model for imitation the past is always in danger of being altered 
and fictionalized to such an extent that it is wronged, as when major parts are 
forgotten and despised. That is why the monumental method must not dominate 
over the antiquarian and the critical.
Antiquarian history helps human beings to look upon their origins with 
love and trust. It services life in that it inspires us to preserve what is handed
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down to us and reproduce it for our purposes. For the antiquarian the history of 
his family, his town, his country, becomes his history. He sees himself in it and 
identifies with it as it becomes part of him. It is: The feeling of the tree that clings 
to its roots, the happiness of knowing one’s growth to be not merely arbitrary and 
fortuitous but the inheritance, the fruit and the blossom, of a past that does not 
merely justify but crowns the present" (UAH, p.18). There is danger also in anti­
quarian history. If everything ancient becomes regarded as equally venerable, 
and those without respect for traditions despised, then the historical no longer 
preserves life but mummifies it. Antiquarian history degenerates the moment it 
no longer gives soul to life in the present. It too must not be allowed to dominate 
over the other methods because it only serves to preserve and not to create life.
These dangers make clear the necessity for critical history, which also 
serves life. Human beings need to judge the past, to interrogate it and condemn 
it when need be. "Every past is worth condemning; this is the rule in mortal 
affairs, which always contain a large measure of human power and human weak­
ness" (UAH, p. 21). Life, not justice is the standard of judgment here, but life’s 
judgment is always unmerciful and unjust. Critical history is the juncture at which 
forgetfulness and remembrance meet. Human beings need to forget that life and 
injustice are one. Critical history comes in when injustice becomes obvious, and 
destroys this injustice, following which we can forget again and begin to build 
again. Nietzsche admits that this is a dangerous process because the men who 
judge and annihilate the past are dangerous as "though we condemn the errors 
and think we have escaped them, we cannot escape the fact that we spring from 
them" (UAH, p. 21).
Critical history, it is important to remember, is not history as science.
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Nietzsche has doubts about history as a science. Since the past is never defi­
nitely dead, there can be no knowledge of history outside c*' time. History as 
knowledge is always transformed because it participates in histcry as becoming. 
The past continues to live through infinite changes thanks tc its remembered 
presence. It is forgotten and remembered, newly found even though it seemed 
familiar, becoming a powerful force even when it is taken as an indifferent thing. 
The live testimony of authentic history does not permit us to knew the past exact­
ly, what was depends on the present. That is why authentic history can never 
become a pure science. History as knowledge is dangerous because it shuts 
down the infinite possibilities of a vital existence which is opened by the doors of 
remembrance. History as science is an excess of the histcncal, from which 
Nietzsche believes modern men suffer. "Knowledge, taken in excess without 
hunger, even contrary to desire, has no more effect of transforming the external 
life, and remains hidden in a chaotic inner world that the modem man has a curi­
ous pride in calling his ‘real personality’" (UAH, p.23). The three type of history 
must be combined for a proper balance. They represent the instinctual in history 
and to banish this instinct as modem men have done results in turning men into 
shades and abstractions, hiding behind the mask of men of culture.
For Nietzsche, there is no such thing as objectivity in history. There is no 
detachment or indifference in the judgment or in the writing of history. On the 
contrary, the real objectivity is that of the artist because the past can only be 
explained by what is most powerful in the present and that is the creative forces 
at work. "Only by straining the noblest qualities you have to their highest power 
will you find out what is greatest in the past, most worth knowing and preserving 
" (UAH, p.40). History as knowledge or as fact, with its pretension to a total 
knowledge of the past, destroys the assimilating capacity of memory and with it
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the personality of the fact by assuming that we can temporarily identify with any 
strange society in any way which is other than instinctual. It reduces the past to a 
simple chain of events.
This is where Nietzsche’s criticism of historicism reminds us of Grant’s 
description of the modem paradigm of knowledge, which, if we recall, is the hold­
ing of objects before us so that they give us their reasons for being the way they 
are. That is precisely what Nietzsche criticizes in historicism. As a science, it 
holds the past before us as an object so that our instinctual judgment of appreci­
ation, admiration, or disgust, is dampened. The most important thing for 
Nietzsche in the historical sense is an attachment to the past as something real 
which has the power to move and change us.
“Anyone who manages to experience the history of humanity as a whole 
as his own history will feel in an enormously generalized way all the grief...of the 
hero on the evening after a battle, that has decided nothing but brought him 
wounds and the loss of his friend. But if one endured, if one could endure this 
immense sum of grief of all kinds while yet being the hero who, as a second day
of battle breaks, welcomes the dawn and his future this would surely have to
result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far” (GS, 4, #337). This is 
the real assimilation of the past. This is what it means to have a historical sense 
so that the past is fertilized in the present and helps produce a bright future.
The Eternal Return of the same
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Return was the one which moved him
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the most but also the one which even Nietzsche’s most ardent fans have trouble 
swallowing. Put simply, it is that being is not infinitely new becoming, since after 
an extraordinary amount of time, everything returns again. Everything that is has 
already been and will be again an infinite number of times. “Everything goeth, 
everything retumeth; eternally rolleth the wheel of existence. Everything dieth, 
everything blossometh forth again; eternally runneth on the year of existence... 
Every moment beginneth existence, around every ‘Here’ rolleth the ball ‘There’. 
The middle is everywhere. Crooked is the path of eternity” (Z, p.266).
But this simple outline is not enough to capture a doctrine which oscillates 
between being defined by a determined content and given as an object of knowl­
edge and being an undetermined belief taken as an interpretation of existence 
which evades all pretense to knowledge. Indeed, although Nietzsche uses scien­
tific arguments to bolster his doctrine, he appears to do so more to refute meta­
physical idealism than anything else and in the end it remains a philosophical 
doctrine.
Nietzsche builds the doctrine on reality as he sees it — that is the reality 
of incessant becoming and the transformation of things. For him, there can be no 
finality to this becoming. The doctrine is meant, as previously mentioned, to 
break the idealist belief that the world is guided by a providential plan destined to 
bring about the reign of morality by the introduction of the moral category of 
wrong to explain the space between a benevolent God and an indifferent world. 
To this abuse of the notion of finality the Eternal Return opposes “the innocence 
of becoming”. The finality of being was brought about by the instinct for revenge.
(4) Alexander Nehemas, in Nietzsche. Life as Literature, p. 15.
(5)A.H.J. Knight in Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, p. 116.
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“As far as man has thought, he has introduced the bacillus of revenge into 
things. He has made even God ill with it, he has deprived existence in general of 
its innocence; namely, by tracing back every state of being thus and thus to a 
will, an intention, a responsible act” (WP, 3,#765). The ‘innocence of becoming’ 
is precisely that lack of responsibility, and the Eternal Return is designed to 
restore it.
In many ways the Eternal Return’s lack of adherents is probably due to 
the fact that it presents existence in its most awful aspects - as devoid of sense 
and end; endlessly returning without ever coming to anything. But even though 
this may appear to us as terrible. Zarathustra, its champion, seeks to convince 
us that “it is a blessing and not a blasphemy when I teach that 'above all things 
there standeth the heaven of chance, the heaven of innocence, the heaven of 
hazard, the heaven of wantonness.’ ‘of Hazard’ - that is the oldest nobility in the 
world; that I gave back to all things; I emancipated them from bondage under 
purpose. This freedom and celestial serenity did I put like an azure bell above all 
things, when I taught that over them and through them, no eternal Will willeth” (Z, 
p.201). But this hazard, or chance, of which Zarathustra speaks is not the oppo­
site of necessity; rather it is one of its aspects through which finality is rejected in 
favor of an immoralist interpretation of becoming. Nietzsche makes this abun­
dantly clear when he says that universal chaos, which excludes all finality, does 
not contradict the idea of a cycle.
The critique of finality serves as part of the demonstration of the doctrine. 
Indeed Nietzsche points out the impossibility of giving an end to becoming since 
if the world was governed by a specific end, this end would ensure the presence
(6)Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus . p.150.
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of a certa'n balance in the world. This balance, however, has not been achieved 
even thc_gh it has had all the time in the world to be achieved. Yet becoming 
persists ard so the possibility of balance as an end is eliminated.
This reasoning, indeed the entire doctrine itself, relies on Nietzsche’s con­
ception of time as a real thing and not only, as Kant believed, an a priori form of 
perception. Where he will admit that space is a subjective form, like matter, he 
denies the same status to time. For him “change belongs to the essence, there­
fore also temporality” (WP,4, #1064). That time is infinite denies the possibility of 
a divine creation of the world, since creation requires a beginning.
But proving that time is real is impossible. Nietzsche tries to bolster the 
doctrine by showing that force is finite. Indeed, if force is finite, infinite becoming 
is impossible and contradictory because it supposes a continual increase of 
force and Nietzsche clearly believes that is not possible, according to the law of 
constants in energy. If force is limited then the number of variations, combina­
tions and developments of that force, even though immense, is determined and 
not infinite. And since time is infinite and we have shown that the possibility of a 
balance is nil (for Nietzsche at least), it must be that all these possible develop­
ments have already occurred countless times and will occur countless times 
again. By putting all this together, Nietzsche creates a picture of the universe as 
a finite and constant force acting in a finite space according to a becoming that 
will constantly repeat itself. There is thus a continuous cycle whose immanence 
is radical and which effectively eliminates all possible reference to any meaning­
ful end or goal.
Nietzsche’s efforts to ground the doctrine of the Eternal Return seem to
page 47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
me to lay to rest the issue of whether or not he actually believed in it. Alexander 
Nehemas, in Nietzsche. Life as Literature, holds that the doctrne is “not a theory 
of the world but a view of the ideal life." (4) He believes that Nietzsche does not 
believe that the history of the world repeats itself in an endless cycle but rather 
that Nietzsche uses the doctrine to show that a life can only be justified if it is 
lived in such a way that we would want to live it again in the same way. While 
Nehemas is probably not completely wrong, Nietzsche did intend for the doctrine 
to be used as an incentive to live a better life. However, there is little reason to 
think that he did not believe the doctrine to be true. A.H.J. Knight in Some 
Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, is probably closer to the truth when 
he says that Nietzsche adopted the doctrine because it suited his social and cul­
tural purposes, but having adopted it "he is carried away by it, becomes 
enthralled or intoxicated. This personal experience convinces him that such a 
splendid, such an overpowering theory of life must be true as well as desirable: 
were it not true it could not mean so much to him, could not appeal so intensely 
to his instincts. So it is true, and being true it must be capable of logical proof
(5). In this perspective Nietzsche’s efforts to ground the doctrine scientifically 
make sense.
All of Nietzsche’s efforts to give a foundation to his doctrine of the Eternal 
Return are related to his thinking out the relationship between becoming and the 
will to power. The relationship, however, is subject to some controversy among 
Nietzsche interpreters. As says Rose Pfeffer in Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionvsus: 
"many interpreters have stressed the existence of a contradiction between a tele- 
ological 'will to power* and a non-teleological 'eternal recurrence', between eter­
nal development and eternal sameness. However it is my contention that the two 
concepts are closely interconnected and must be understood as a unity" (6). It is
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not my wish to become involved in an academic quarrel which seems revolve 
around Nietzsche’s motives for rejecting Schopenhauer. What does seem clear 
to me, however, is that in trying to dislodge the old metaphysical category of 
being, Nietzsche is drawn to interpret becoming as a way of being. It is not for 
nothing that the doctrine is caiied the Eternal Return of the Same. That Same 
shows the persistence of becoming as becoming, and the necessity of the repeti­
tion of each event inside that becoming. “To impose upon becoming the charac­
ter of being - that is the supreme will to power... That everything recurs is the 
closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being: - high point of 
meditation" (WP, 3,#617).
We saw earlier how in thinking out the will to power Nietzsche tried to 
think what being as becoming is. The Eternal Return comes to complete that 
reflection by thinking out how becoming is becoming, thus explaining how every­
thing can repeat itself while nothing ceases to change. But in thinking this, 
Nietzsche had to explain how the act of surpassing oneself can define the will to 
power yet still fit into the cycle of the eternal return.
His answer is that the Eternal Return is a perpetual exhortation to surpass 
oneself. It pushes the will to power to liberate itself from useless nostalgia and to 
adhere to becoming, making it its field of creativity. In that sense, the doctrine is 
truly ‘the hammer’ , meant to break apart the world in which God reigned 
supreme and sculpt the figure of the overman. For all his efforts to ground it, the 
doctrine is not in Nietzsche the result of an intellectual meditation. It is rather an 
instinctual grasping of eternity in one instant, because it is in the instant that the 
truth of becoming as becoming is revealed. If this grasping of eternity in the form 
of the Eternal Return is not to become instant despair, the will to power must
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intervene to embrace life itself as becoming. The Eternal Return then becomes 
the highest approbation. Such a philosophy wants: “a Dionysian affirmation of 
the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection - it wants the eter­
nal circulation: - the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. 
The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionisyan relationship to 
existence - my formula for this is amor fati” (WP, 4, #1041).
Amor fati, love of fate, is loyalty to the earth, it is the acceptance, in joy, of 
the immanence of becoming. It is saying yes to everything, even those painful 
and undesirable moments, and what Nietzsche meant when he said “Said you 
ever yea to one joy? O my friends, then said ye Yea also unto all woe. All things 
are enlinked, enlaced, enamored, - Wanted you ever to come twice; said ye 
ever: Thou pleasest me happiness! Instant! Moment! ‘ then wanted ye all to 
come back again!... Ye eternal ones, ye love it eternally and for all time: and also 
unto woe do ye say: Hence! Go! but come back! For joys all want - eternity!" (Z, 
p.396). That saying yes, can thus be accomplished in one instant, and even if it 
is not sustained, that affirmation signifies that at every moment of becoming, 
something is touched.
That yes also presides over the transformation of the will to vengeance 
into a creative will because the Eternal Return, as the hammer, crushes away 
the resistance of a transcendental idealism and makes way for free initiative. It 
demands that we live in a way which will make us want to live that way again; it 
is a new categorical imperative, but without any ethical content. It will give us 
that courage which will kill death, for the one who, in love with life, will say “Was 
that life? Well! Once more!” (Z, p. 189).
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That love of fate which comes with the acceptance of the Eternal Return, 
that yes to life, achieves its triumph in the redemption of the past. Before it, the 
will was powerless before what was done, reduced to an irritated spectator of all 
that had happened, developing a will to vengeance because he could not will 
back in time, thus conceiving life as a punishment. Now all that is past, since 
“The past of man to redeem, and every ‘It was’ to transform, until the Will saith: ‘ 
But so did I will it! So shall I will it “ (Z p242). In the circular movement of things, 
human beings produce anew the past which produced them.
The problem of history in the age of progress
At the beginning of Philosophy in the Mass Age Grant asks for whom and 
in what way history is a problem. He answers that it is a problem for the moral 
philosopher and for all those who seek to make judgments about right action. 
History as a problem has been revealed by the analysis of the governing princi­
ples of action in western civilization and particularly in North America, in that it “is 
the only society that has no history of its own before the age of progress.” 
Because of that it “incarnates more than any other the values and principles of 
the age of progress" (PMA, p.2). The age of progress is that corporate capitalist 
society with its technological ethos that we discussed in the second chapter. Its 
relations to the moral traditions of the past are more tenuous here than any­
where else because these traditions do not belong to our history.
But even though Grant considers what has been lost to North America, 
namely the pre-modem tradition of transcendent rationality, of philosophic free­
dom, and of contemplation inherited by western civilization from the Greeks 
through Christianity, he acknowledges the new possibilities of our historical situa-
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tion. Those possibilities are opened up by the technological conquest of nature 
which, in its overcoming of natural necessity and its opening up of the bound­
aries of theoretical thought, has freed up human energy “to attain objectives 
beyond those practically necessary” (PMA, p. 11). In other words:
Always before in history, if some few men were to be able to pursue 
the life of philosophy, it depended on the labor of others, who 
because of that labor, were themselves removed from the possibili­
ty of the philosophic life. The ideal of human freedom the philoso­
phers held up was always denied by their dependence upon the 
work of others. Such a contradiction becomes increasingly unnec­
essary. Reason, considered as domination over nature, has freed 
man from his enslavement to nature so that it is open to him to pur­
sue the life of reason as more than simply domination. The world of 
mass production and consumption and the idea of social equality 
makes this possible (PMA, p.11).
Although, as we have previously seen through the discussion of his cri­
tique of modern liberalism, Grant no longer believes that the modem ideal of 
freedom and equality can be sustained in our technological society, what comes 
out and remains of this earlier discussion is that the very novelty of our historical 
situation is grounds for renewed philosophical reflection. Indeed Philosophy in 
the Mass Age is Grant’s Hegelian book. Not only is he inspired by Hegel’s vision 
of time as history, he accepts Hegel’s description of the task of philosophy - ‘The 
owl of Minerva takes its flight at Twilight’ as meaning that “human beings only 
pursue philosophy, a rigorous and consistent attempt to think the meaning of 
existence.... when an old system of meaning has disappeared with an old soci­
ety, and when we recognize that the new society which is coming to be raises 
new questions which cannot be understood within the old system” (PMA, p.5-6).
If self-understanding is to emerge from an awareness of the historical 
newness of our situation, it can only manifest itself through a recognition of our
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differences with those who have come before us. That is why Grant’s elaboration 
and critique of the problem of history takes the form, in Philosophvin the Mass 
Age and in Time as History, of a comparison between the modem conscious­
ness of history and the mythic consciousness of traditional religious cultures. 
Grant, inspired here by Mircea Eliade, describes the mythic consciousness as 
the archetypal ordering of all meaning. In mythic consciousness, actions and 
events only have meaning “as repeating and participating” in the archetype, “the 
original divine model occurring in illo tempore” (PMA, p. 17-18). Chaos and 
meaninglessness are overcome by the cyclical re-enactments of these eternal 
archetypes. In Plato Grant finds the justification of this ancient mystical tradition 
because he outlined how “time is considered as the moving image of eternity 
and [how] the passing events of life only have meaning as they lead men to the 
unchanging reality of God” (PMA, p. 20). According to Grant, this view of eternity 
is the foundation not only of the traditional mystical view, but of the tradition of 
natural law as well. Moreover, Plato’s “doctrine of the soul and of knowledge 
[enabled] human beings to come to know themselves as free, and therefore 
finally outside religious myths and images" (PMA, p. 21). That philosophical 
knowledge was the means by which individuals could move “by purification 
beyond the cycle of time” that “vehicle through which necessity and good play 
out their relation over and over" (PMA, p.22).
Modern consciousness of history, on the other hand, sees time as “a 
series of unique and irreversible events" which are shaped by human beings 
through creative acts of will. In the conscious, volitional making of history, 
human beings are required to orient themselves to the infinite as “the limitless 
possibilities....for action in space and time” rather than as the”etemal-beyond- 
time” (PMA, p.25) of mythic consciousness. This modern consciousness also
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requires that human beings view themselves as individuals taking part in shaping 
their world, whereas the mythic consciousness, with its archetypal assimilation of 
human action downplayed individuality and, more significant /  for Grant, the 
importance of suffering which, as time runs through its course, infinitely repeats 
itself through an infinite series of cycles.
For Grant, the break between modern and mythic consciousness
occurred chiefly because of Christianity, or to be more precise, a particular form
of Christianity. The view of time as history :
was brought out from the narrow confines of the Jewish people into 
the main stream of western civilization by Christianity. This is what 
the doctrine of the Trinity is: it incorporates into the timeless God of 
the Greeks, the God of project and of suffering; that is, the God of 
love. The sense of the unique importance of historical events was 
made absolute by the Incarnation. Our redemption has been 
achieved once and for all in His passion and death. This was not 
going to be repeated an infinite number of times. It was a unique 
and irreversible event (PMA, p.45).
Time, then, can no longer be Ihe moving image of eternity’, rather it becomes
the realm in which good overcomes evil, lead by a God to whom all things are
possible. In this view of temporal events, God acts directly and personally, and
particular events are seen as “ concrete expressions of divine will” (PMA, p. 45)
so that each event is seen as unique and irreversible because its meaning is
derived from the will of God manifested through it. Thus directed, human action
is always oriented to a future where it will find its fulfillment, and time becomes
finite. Thus it is that “time was raised up by redemption in time, and the future by
the exaltation of the eschaton" (TH, p.29).
The full impact of this radical break with the ancient mythic tradition and 
with natural law was delayed by subsequent attempts, from Augustine to 
Aquinas, to synthesize Greek philosophy and Christianity. But it is precisely the
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conviction that the divine will is expressed in history which makes all such 
attempts at synthesis doomed to failure. With the Reformation came the idea of 
freedom as infinite, accompanied by the belief that human beings could shape 
historical events to their wills - brought about byLuther’s belief that “no man 
could find his proper rest in any natural images" or in the “finite images of 
thought and ritual" (PMA, p. 49-50). Grant sees this negation of Luther’s as a 
dialectical affirmation that “the human spirit cannot be limited by any determina­
tions" (PMA, p. 50).
For Grant, the error of western Christianity was that it “simplified divine 
love by identifying it too closely with immanent power in the world. Both 
Protestants and Catholics became triumphalist by failing to recognize the dis­
tance between the order of good and the order of necessity. So they became 
exclusivist and imperialist, arrogant and dynamic" (TJ, p. 76). Moreover, by 
opening the doors to infinite freedom, the Reformation created the instrument of 
its own destruction. Theoretically, the principle meant the rational criticism of 
dogma and tradition; practically, it called for the immanence of project and 
reform. The rationalist attack on Christianity destroyed the doctrines of divine law 
and providence, replacing them with secularized and immanent versions of the 
same principles, but it left the framework of Christian ideas about time, as orient­
ed toward the future, intact.
Time as History
Grant believes that history is one of the key words of our civilization: “the
(7)Joan O’Donovan, George Grant and the Twilight of Justice.p.115
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word ‘history’ comes forth from our lips and pens near the centre of what is most 
often said. ‘History will judge my Vietnam policies,’ says a president. This is a 
history making flight,’ says an astronaut. “History’ demands, commands, 
requires, obliges, teaches,, etc., etc.” (TH, p.6). When he outlines the different 
meanings of history, Grant points to the division of its use which most often 
results in ambiguity. “On the one hand, the word is used to denote an activity that 
some men pursue - the study of the past. It is also used to denote a certain kind 
of reality - human existing - the whole of which, whether in the past, present or 
future, we call ‘history’, and which is distinguished from other kinds of existing” 
(TH, p.8). For Grant, these two uses of the word ‘history’ cannot finally be sepa­
rated because they are interdependent. The enormous interest in our past is 
generated by the “belief that knowledge about man will be brought forth by the 
assiduous study of his genesis and development” (TH, p.9). So the interest in 
history as a study is directly related to the belief that we are historical beings, 
and as such are only understandable in terms of our genesis and development.
Our use of history is further complicated by the modem idea of evolution, 
which represents how modem thought has extended the scientific concept of 
universal process to include not only human beings and everything from stones 
to animals, but reason (Rousseau, Kant), and even God (Hegel and Whitehead), 
all of whom now have their own history. This, however, presented its own set of 
problems in that philosophers such as Rousseau, Kant and Hegel now had to 
think of a way of reconciling the modem scientific conception of nature, which 
excluded the idea of final purpose, with
human freedom as purposive. Their way of reconciling was to see to it that “the 
realm of history was distinguished from the realm of nature. ‘History’ was used to 
describe the particular human situation in which we are not only made but make”
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(TH, p.12). Such a view of history can bring forth two facets of modernity in 
which “man is either conceived as the creator, who arose from accidental evolu­
tion, or if evolution is itself conceived of within a terminology about the divine [as 
in Whitehead], man is then viewed as a co-operator, a co-creator with God” (TH, 
p.13). However they differ in detail, these two facets come together as represen­
tative of modernity in that they see human beings as not only a part of evolution 
but as its “spearhead who can consciously direct the very process from which he 
came forth” (TH, p. 13).
The word 'time' arises from our experience of existence as a coming to be 
and a passing away. “Because ‘has been', ‘is now,’ and ‘will be’ make possible 
our purposes but also dirempt us of them, it is no wonder that through the ages 
men have tried to understand the temporality of their lives. In our age, astonish­
ment about that temporality has been calmed by apprehending it above all as 
history” (TH, p.13). That apprehension of history as time is characterized by our 
pursuit of the past as dominated by an imagined and/or desired future - “When 
we speak of the present historical situation we are oriented toward the future, in 
the sense that we are trying to gather the intricacies of the present so that we 
can calculate what we must be resolute in doing to bring about the future we 
desire” (TH, p. 16). The study of the past then becomes no more than a vehicle 
for our accomplishments as modems, in the bringing about of novel events. This 
making of novelty is dependent on “our prediction over human and non-human 
nature. These accomplishments were the work of men who were determined to 
make the future different from what the past had been, men oriented to that 
future in which greater events than yet have been, will be“ (TH, p. 16).
For Grant, then, to understand time as history is to “think our orientation to
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the future together with the will to mastery” (TH, p.17). History then becomes the 
realm in which the reality of our actions is translated into the control of chance. 
Indeed, for Grant, modem men are historical beings because they understand 
themselves historically, but also because they have more power to make novel 
events happen in the potential future, so that “the concentration upon time as 
future and the dynamism of doing fed on each other” (TH, p.20). It is therefore in 
the language of the will to mastery (as described in Chapter 1) that Grant finds 
the link between our orientation to the future and our potential to mastery. Joan 
O’Donovan, in George Grant and the Twilight of Justice, has expressed accu­
rately and succinctly how the language of will and the language of history:
has three levels of reference for Grant. It refers to a universal 
aspect of human action, to a specifically modem interpretation of 
human action, and to a peculiar reality of modern action. These 
strands of meaning are correlative or interdependent: each must be 
thought along with and in terms of the others. This is so because 
the word willing, like the word ‘history’, makes present a historical 
and experiential totality proceeding from ‘some central source,’ 
from an animating principle, which, however, is not distinct from the 
manifold aspects or ‘expressions of the totality. It follows that think­
ing this animating principle should be a movement among its mani­
fold expressions that grasps their interpenetration, the refraction of 
each on the others. (7)
Grant, in trying to enucleate the modern conception of time as history and the 
will to mastery, has brought before us the single totality expressed in those con­
cepts.
Again, we cannot help but notice the similarities between Grant’s inter­
twined enucleation of time as history and the will to mastery and how Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of the Eternal Return complements his notion of the will to power. We 
can also easily see in Grant’s analysis of modem human beings as historical 
beings why Nietzsche exhorts us to develop our historical sense. In effectively 
demonstrating just how much we think of ourselves as historical beings who cre-
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ate their own future Grant has shown how Nietzsche’s challenge has been taken 
up in modernity. It is not for nothing that Grant said of Nietzsche that he had 
“thought the conception of time as history more comprehensively than any other 
modem thinker before or since” (TH, p.32). And although Grant says that our 
creative desires were oriented by a vision of the future which involved the cre­
ation of a better world, he makes it quite clear that:
In the conceptions of history now prevalent among those ‘creative’ 
men who plan the mastery of the planet, changing the world 
becomes ever more an end in itself. It is undertaken less simply to 
overcome the natural accidents that frustrate our humanity and 
more and more for the sheer sake of the creation of ‘novelty’.... We 
will, not so much for some end beyond will, but for the sake of will­
ing itself. In this sense the challenge of the will is endless to the 
resolute, because there is always more ‘creation’ to be carried out 
(TH, p.27).
In this we recognize that Nietzsche’s hammer was indeed effective, and that we 
have not only developed our historical sense but have taken up his exhortation 
to say yes to life, yes to becoming, yes to creative willing.
Fate
The greatness of Nietzsche for Grant, is that “he accepted ‘en pleine con­
science de cause’ that temporality enfolds human beings and that they experi­
ence that temporality as history” (TH, p.32) because “most men want it both 
ways in thought and in practice, the nobility of Nietzsche is that he did not” (TH, 
p.35). In others words, most men want the freedom of historicism as well the 
security of a non-historical past.
Despite the fact that Grant testifies to the greatness of Nietzsche’s por-
(8) Joan O'Donovan, George Grant and the Twilioht of Justice, p. 177
(9)Joan O’Donovan, Georoe Grant and the Twilioht of Justice, p. 170
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trayal of our time as historical through his own analysis of the same phenome­
non, he does not accept that that it is the ultimate way we should lives our lives. 
He says: “the conception of time as history is not one in which I think life can be 
lived properly. It is not a conception which we are fitted for." (TH, p.58). So while 
he accepts and endorses Nietzsche’s account of modernity as true in that “it lays 
bare the fate of technical man, not as an object held in front of us, but as that in 
which our very selves are involved in the proofs of the science that lays it bare" 
(TH, p.57), he admits that he can only respond with ‘simple incomprehension’ to 
Nietzsche’s call to love that fate.
What Grant does not understand is how Nietzsche can urge us to love a 
fate which is nothing other than the endless creation and destruction of the 
world, mostly because he does not see how dynamism is preferable to peace, or 
how motion is better than rest. Moreover he does not understand how love can 
be anything other than a desire for perfection.
I do not understand how anyone could love fate, unless within the 
details of our fates there could appear, however rarely, intimations 
that they are illuminated; intimations, that is, of perfection (call it if 
you will God) in which our desires for good find their rest and their 
fulfillment. I do not say anything about the relation of that perfection 
to the necessities of existing, except that there must be some rela­
tion; nor do I state how or when the light of that perfection could 
break into the ambiguities and afflictions of any particular person. I 
simply state the argument for perfection (sometimes called the 
ontological argument): namely that human beings are not beyond 
good and evil, and that the desire for good is a broken hope without 
perfection, because only the desire to become perfect does in fact 
make us less imperfect. This means that the absurdities of time - its 
joys as well as its diremptions - are to be taken not simply as histo­
ry, but as enfolded in an unchanging meaning, which is untouched 
by potentiality or change (TH, p.60).
Indeed to Grant, the contemplation of eternity not as timelessness but as
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endless time seems to be a “vision that would drive men mad - not in the sense 
of divine madness, but a madness destructive of good” (TH, p.60). It is ironic that 
while Nietzsche, who bemoans the death of tragedy at the hands of the opti­
mistic rationalism of Socrates, should exhort us to be happy and to love the 
chaos which we are faced with, it is Grant who sets before us as tragic the fate 
of modem historical man. The tragedy, for Grant, is that we are caught in a para­
dox because to “love fate must include loving the fate that makes us part of the 
modem project; it must include loving that which has made us oblivious of eterni­
ty - that eternity without which I cannot understand how it is possible to love fate" 
(TH, p.63). It is tragic and paradoxical beyond Greek tragedy and beyond 
Nietzsche, since even the early Greeks reached an intuition of transcendent jus­
tice through suffering and chaos, while modem fate is oblivious to such intuitions. 
It is possible for Nietzsche to embrace the modem oblivion of eternity as the 
preparation for the coming of the overman only because he believes that human 
beings are beyond good and evil. For him there is no call to morality, no desiring 
attention to perfection, other than what is put forward by the impetus of the will - 
growth.
But what does Grant suggest we do? He has often been criticized for not 
offering any tangible answers, and for being a pessimist in having abandoned all 
immanent grounds for hope. Grant’s answer is that he does not know what we 
can do, other than remember, think and love. What is it we need to remember? - 
tradition. In Lament for a Nation Grant admits that he cannot know whether or 
not the universal and homogenous state is the best social order. This is a sur­
prise considering that he accepts Leo Strauss’s description of such a state as a 
tyranny. But we can understand it in the context of his historical discussion of 
providence, which for him is not scrutable, and so “if one cannot be sure about
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the answer to the most important question, then tradition is the best basis for the 
practical life. Those who loved the older traditions of Canada may be allowed to 
lament what has been lost, even though they do not know whether or not this 
loss will lead to a greater political good" (LN, p.96). By doing this, Grant acknowl­
edges the pervasiveness of those certainties on which our technological civiliza­
tion was built and the difficulty of thinking those truths of the present together 
with what a knowledge of eternity outside of time could bring us. This is further 
made difficult by the fact that whatever certainties that knowledge of the eternal 
could bring us are present to us only as an absence, as habits of thinking and 
acting which do not belong to life as we know it.
That is why Grant calls us to remembering because perhaps in remem­
bering what has been lost we make present a particular good as other than our 
own, thus bringing to light its universality. In this encounter with “the losers of his­
tory,” that is, those who stand for whatever is denied by our own in the present, 
we may be opened up to universal standards by which we can judge our own. 
Thus Grant makes of historical recollection a way to the knowledge of an eternal 
and unchanging good. But this way of knowing the good is at best episodic, 
dependent on chance events resulting from accidents of existence. Still these 
accidents are “perhaps [indicative that] reverence belongs to man qua man and 
is indeed the matrix of human nobility" (TH, p. 67) since “it may be that at any 
time or place, human beings can be opened up to the whole in their loving and 
thinking, even as its complete intelligibility eludes them. If this be true of any time 
or place, then one is not, after all, trapped in historicism” (TH, p. 68).
With this last statement Grant seems to prove O’Donovan wrong in her 
suspicion that he “cannot abandon the search for meaning, for intelligible direc-
page62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
tion, in the course of human affairs” (8). It is easy, of course, to see how 
O'Donovan could have made that mistake: Grant’s use of fate, his references to 
our ‘civiiizational destiny’, all point to a concept of history as directional and pur­
poseful. But there can be no question that Grant sees both history and nature as 
blind and indifferent. Does he not warn us against seeing providence as 
scrutable, against seeing divine will as immanent? His appeal to tradition is not 
an effort to “attribute a universal course to temporal events “ (9). It is a call to 
understand where we have been in order to better understand where we are 
now. This does not in any way mean that what happened in the past happened 
necessarily. Tradition is not fate, even if we are able to trace, as Grant does, its 
continuous and discontinuous path through history.
Yet the question remains - why does Grant refer to our civiiizational des­
tiny? It is my opinion that Grant’s use of fate is strategic. It is a way for him to 
show up the darkness of technological society as darkness. It is a way to remind 
us that, as blind necessity, nature cannot be manipulated and controlled as we 
believe it can. By putting before us modem civiiizational destiny as a unified and 
universal fate he is challenging us to try to overcome that fate. Overcoming that 
fate means seeing that nature is something to be contemplated and suffered and 
bringing science back into line as a knowledge of necessity in harmony with the 
enjoyment of beauty, the acceptance of affliction, and the love of God.
Conclusion - History on Trial
Historical sense is for Nietzsche the sense of the finality of becoming. 
One of the implications of the historical sense is that horizons are revealed as 
horizons - as man-made perspectives - since through time we are never the
page 63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
same. In bringing to light the historical sense Nietzsche has indeed given a 
deadly blow to modem liberalism by showing the shallowness of its historical 
hope. Historical sense denies any justification for viewing history teleologically. 
Any basis for believing in the growing rationality of the race is eliminated, as is 
any basis for believing rationality to be good. All these are just more assertions 
of value which are intelligible only within a horizon. The historical sense shows 
us that these horizons are not apprehensions about the nature of things but 
weak attempts to pacify consciousness against the terror of becoming. In the 
next chapter we will see how concepts such as purpose, unity, and truth are 
deceptions, mere assertions of value that have no ground outside ourselves.
The historical sense, Nietzsche says (and Grant agrees), is the outcome 
of centuries of Christianity. Specifically, according to Nietzsche, it is the outcome 
of the disciplined search for truth started by Christians and pursued by modem 
science. This is where Grant would disagree. For him, it is not the search for 
truth but the notion of time as history which was given us by a triumphalist ver­
sion of Christianity which presents a problem. In discussing the historical sense 
both Grant and Nietzsche bring to full light the contradictions of modem liberal­
ism in its belief that equality, moral progress and happiness for all will be realized 
at some point in history. It finds itself in flagrant contradiction with its own destiny 
- that modem science, in the name of truth, has proven that reason is only an 
instrument which can’t teach us anything about the best way to live.
Nietzsche is well aware that by unveiling our horizons as horizons he is 
plunging human willing into a crisis. He is not willing to offer any kind of safety 
net as his amor fati must be willed in a world where there is no possibility of infi­
nite or finite transcendence of becoming. The doctrine of the Eternal Return is
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what Nietzsche hoped will bring us beyond nihilism, beyond the undirected and 
destructive willing of novelty brought about by a desire for revenge against time’s 
thrall, to a beginning of willing novelty in joy. Ultimately it is the recognition that 
time is dominant - that no past is past and no future has yet been - yet it retains 
an openness to the immediate future and does not settle into a comforting hori­
zon. Thus Nietzsche’s historicism finds a way of affirming both the past and the 
future as necessity and freedom are reconciled and the reality and illusion of 
novelty can be thought together.
The notion of time as history is compatible with Nietzsche’s conception of 
the Eternal Return because both see time as that realm in which human beings 
give shape to the world through their creative wills. In this conscious, volitional 
making of history, human beings orient themselves to the infinite as the limitless 
possibilities for action in space and time. However, to view time as history is not 
compatible with a vision of eternity as unchanging goodness, rather it makes us 
oblivious to such a vision. Time as history makes us oblivious of eternity because 
it orients us towards a desired future which we come to believe it is in our power 
to create. We become so focused on changing and shaping the world that we 
forget that change can only be measured and defined against the permanence of 
eternity as unchanging goodness. Nietzsche urges us only towards creative will­
ing, he does not need such a vision of eternity because creative willing requires 
that we impose our own values onto things so that we don’t have to measure or 
define anything by standards other than our own.
Philosophers like Grant, who have refused to beiieve that becoming is the 
rule, can make generalizations about the meaning of human life out of the con­
viction of something permanent. Change can be measured and defined in terms
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of that permanence. Grant shows that the notion of time as history is in the mod­
em world oblivion of eternity as unchanging goodness. Yet his distrust of the 
notion is not a condemnation of the historical sense. He cannot deny the reality 
which we live with - temporality - and which he acknowledges as part of what it 
means to be human, and which we can know and come to understand through 
our tradition. Tradition is dynamic, it is both in time and timeless: in time as it 
changes, out of it as it it remembered. Grant’s appeal to tradition can in a way 
take us out of time as history to eternity as timeless.
But the main focus of this thesis, being, should not be forgotten. We have 
just seen how the question of being necessitates a holistic approach. It is like an 
octopus reaching out with its many tentacles to enfold all the facets of existence. 
The first two chapters have shown us how science, politics, and history are 
determined by it. The third will confirm what we already begin to see, that morali­
ty and epistemology are also integral to the question of being.
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CHAPTER 4
Morality
“There is an old illusion - it is called good and ev il”  
Nietzsche (Z, 3, p246)
Nietzsche and Grant have very different views of morality. For Nietzsche 
there can be no well-defined content to morality: anything which enhances life is 
good, the rest is bad. Grant’s view, that we are measured and defined, is the 
opposite of Nietzsche’s, who believes that we do measure and define. In order to 
understand where they stand, we would do well to remember that their views on 
morality correspond to their respective visions of being as becoming and the 
eternal as unchanging goodness. As well, in the context of modernity, their views 
of morality are a response to the crisis they have already described. As such 
their respective views are clear choices offered to us, in lieu of liberalism, in a 
time of uncertainty, crisis and tension of the spirit.
Beyond Good and Evil
Moving beyond good and evil, according to Nietzsche, means leaving 
behind metaphysical dogmatism. Metaphysical thought, for Nietzsche, does not 
acknowledge that reality is a mixture of negations and affirmations which consti­
tute the elements and which, even though often contradictory, are inextricably 
bound together. In that sense “the fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the 
belief in antithesis of values” (BGE, #2). If the senses and reason are discordant, 
for example, it is proof that they cooperate only under constraint and that they 
each really represent a different reality. Thus metaphysical thought declares that
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the ambiguities of the world which we experience are the result of deceptive 
appearances and that we must conceive of a completely different sort of organi­
zation which would order these antagonists according to their proper value. Two 
systems then appear which categorize things according to their value depending 
on whether they are effectively real or whether they are ephemeral illusion. For 
Nietzsche, this dualism is a moral dualism, not only because morality is the ter­
rain of predilection for this view, but also because it is a moralistic interpretation 
of the world according to which good is radically opposed to evil since their 
nature and origin have nothing in common. Evil being everything that provokes 
suffering, anguish, change and death, while good is an ideal that contains noth­
ing bad, dangerous or uncertain. In the face of each reality, this dualism disasso­
ciates the positive and the negative, imagining that it can restore, at least as a 
rule for conduct, the ideal of an original immaculate reign.
For Nietzsche the negative, or wrongness is ihe indispensable element of 
all creativity. The urge to eliminate it results in killing, in human beings, the vital 
principle of transcendence, degrading them and transforming them into sheep. 
Behind the condemnations made in the name of morality, there is the hatred of 
innovators who are autonomous and inventive. “What is new, however, is always 
evil, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers 
and the pieties; and only what is old is good“ (GS,1,#4).
This moral dualism twists around the concepts of phenomenon and of 
reality, making a mockery of the senses. Instead of seeing in the phenomenon 
the essence of reality, the phenomenon is reduced to simple appearance so that 
reality is conceived in accordance to an absolute model cut off from any kind of
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relation. Appearances thus slide towards nothingness while reality, as absolute, 
reigns in solitude outside of any manifestation. For Nietzsche this sharp distinc­
tion between reality and appearances is ridiculous since “What could I say about 
any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a 
dead mask that one could place on an unknown X or remove from it! 
Appearance is for me that which lives and is effective and goes so far in its self 
mockery that it makes me feel that this is appearance and will- o’-the-wisp, and a 
dance of spirits and nothing” (GS,1,#54).
This criticism is aimed at Kant, who by conceiving of the thing in itself, dis­
tinguished between the intelligible world and the sensible world following a tradi­
tion which, according to Nietzsche, began with Plato and which has done its best 
to disparage both the senses and the body, the first accused of misleading us 
when it comes to knowledge, the second condemned for perverting our conduct.
All that plurality, diversity and variety of the empirically known 
world, the change of its qualities, the order of its ups and downs, is 
thrown aside mercilessly as mere appearance and delusion; from 
there nothing is to be learnt, therefore all labour is wasted which 
one bestows upon this false, through-and-through futile world, the 
conception of which has been obtained by being humbugged by 
the senses. (EGP, p. 124)
Thus the dissociation between the real world and the world of appear­
ances corresponds to the ontological distinction between the spirit and the body, 
a distinction which is needed to assure in the end the moral and religious salva­
tion of human beings. Nietzsche sees behind these idealistic motivations the 
characteristics of decadence - the fear of becoming, of our instincts, and the 
longing for peace which would dispense human beings from the effort necessary 
to creative willing.
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Nietzsche’s answer is to rehabilitate the senses by subtracting them from 
the influence of morality, to better think them in their authentic creative function. 
We have already seen how he glorifies our instincts and our bodies. Part of the 
way he does that is by criticizing the fable of ‘being’ which metaphysical dualism 
has constructed. Philosophy, through this metaphysical dualism, became a ratio­
nal discourse on being whose ambition was to capture the transcendental predi­
cates of that being. Nietzsche questions the proof of being as a substance and 
its identity with reason. This identity of substance with reason has been used by 
many schools of philosophy to prove that being is intelligible. With his attack on 
the identity of reason with being, Nietzsche wants to break the presupposition 
which assumes that knowledge is the assimilation of an object by the subject 
through which the object, as being, conforms absolutely to the imperatives of 
knowledge. He warns us against thus assuming the obvious presence of being 
and places knowledge in a new terrain, namely that of interpretation.
It is Socrates, says Nietzsche, who gave us a bad example by placing too 
much confidence in the powers of reason. But all philosophers have this tenden­
cy; they have difficulty letting go of the idea that fundamental concepts and the 
categories of reason are a metaphysical certainty. Scientists too are subject to 
Nietzsche’s polemic, in so far as they succumb to the same rationalism. Science 
falls under the same spell in its unconditional faith in the value of truth, which it 
ends up subordinating to the exercise of reason itself, without realizing that by 
doing so it uses moral prejudice to snuff out the right to more decisive truths. It 
is to degrade existence, says Nietzsche, to assume that reason can even begin 
to understand existence; it amounts to reducing it to a mere calculation.
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Moreover to define being as substance, as does moral dualism, is to 
define it in terms of unity, permanence and identity. The result of this is that the 
category of the ‘One’ crushes the fragile network of multiple individualities which 
each correspond to a certain point of view of the world. The fundamental per- 
spectivism of knowledge which Nietzsche advances is eliminated in favor of the 
fiction of universal knowledge, whose truth is dependent on the idea of unity. The 
category of permanence makes a mockery of the reality of becoming, and we 
have already seen how the notion of identity protects being against contradiction 
by casting into the realm of appearances all that does not fit within its neat little 
space. As well, for Nietzsche, the category of transcendent illuminates well how 
the ideal of an intelligible world, with its absolute substance, is a psychological 
projection whereby human beings alienate their real nature by installing, beyond 
the sensible world, another fictitious world which has all the qualities desired by 
human beings.
Nietzsche has uncovered the essence of ontological metaphysics as a 
refuge from the real world. The belief in being as substance is but a conse­
quence. The real motive lying behind it is the refusal to believe in becoming and 
the species of men who think this way is sickly, unproductive and tired of living. 
Such a belief needs to be overcome because it is a slave morality which is char­
acterized by its mediocrity.
What is mediocre in the typical man? That he does not understand 
the necessity for the reverse side of things: that he combats evils 
as if one could dispense with them; that he will not take the one 
with the other - that he wants to erase and extinguish the typical 
character of a thing, a condition, an age, a person, approving of 
only one part of their qualities and wishing to abolish the others.
The ‘desirability’ of the mediocre is what we others combat; the
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ideal conceived as something in which nothing harmful, evil, dan­
gerous, questionable, destructive would remain. Our insight is the 
opposite of this: that with every growth of man, his other side must 
grow too; the highest man, if such a concept be allowed, would be 
the man who represented the antithetical character of existence 
most strongly, as its glory and sole justification - Commonplace 
men can represent only a tiny nook and comer of this natural char­
acter: they perish when the multitude of elements and the tension 
of opposites, i.e., the pre-conditions for greatness in man, increas­
es. (WP, 4, #881)
What Nietzsche means or wants us to do, by urging us beyond good and evil, is 
not to judge the value of something by the criteria offered to us by moral dualism, 
where the good is everything that is comfortable, stable, painless, simple and 
unchanging.
Truth and Value
Nietzsche is not a skeptic when it comes to truth and if we sometimes get 
that impression it is because he is fixing the limits of knowledge as interpretation. 
It is not because he believes that we cannot know anything. These limits must at 
the same time block all the pretensions of ontological metaphysics and apply to 
interpretation so that it too does not slide off the slippery slope into a form of 
absolute knowledge. Conceived of in this way, interpretation is a supple and 
agile knowledge in perpetual mutation in its exploration of reality. It needs to be 
that way because our world is uncertain and changing.
Interpretation is structured according to the world as text and the world as 
chaos. The world as chaos is always second to the world as text because the 
concept of chaos is a limiting concept that outlines the indefinite movement of 
interpretation without blowing up the concept of the text. Indeed for Nietzsche we
page 72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are faced with a mysterious text which we haven't yet deciphered. The text is not 
a manifestation of subjectivity, but a real world of which we can enumerate the 
characteristics "that constitute its reality: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposi­
tion, contradiction, war" (WP, 3, #584). Without such a text we would be con­
demned to relativism, and all criticism, such as Nietzsche's criticism of meta­
physics, would only be passion deprived of any informative content. We should 
not be misled then into thinking that interpretation as Nietzsche sees it is any­
thing other than the spirit of wanting to know things as they are.
Nor should we think that the reality of the text is that of substance in itself. 
The text is present only in the interpretation, of which it is the phenomenal corre­
lation. Interpretation is never immediate proof, it is rather a minute and painstak­
ing deciphering which takes the form of an essay based on regulating hypothe­
ses which describes phenomena instead of trying to explain or prove them. With 
the concept of chaos, Nietzsche tries to think the character of the text. That the 
character of the world is eternal chaos means the failure of any interpretation 
which tries to constitute itself as a science, a system, or a dogma, and so the 
urge to explain everything can only result in a text which is unreadable. We must 
adopt a certain imprecision, a will to simplify if we want to see the value of 
things.
If the text always remains an enigma which opposes chaos to explana­
tion, it is because knowledge is always pluralistic for Nietzsche, and because the 
multiplicity of points of view - perspectivism - prohibits a totality which would 
mean the triumph of a unique interpretation. It is imperative to Nietzsche that all 
notions of unity, of an absolute, be discarded. Being then is conceived of only as
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a flux of relations, which are assumed from a multitude of centres, each reveal­
ing a certain aspect of the world according to the perspective it opens up. The 
text is the mixture and superimposition of these centres, and even if sometimes 
interpretations harden and become dominant, the even changing organization of 
these centres exclude any totalising synthesis. Thus it is by method and not by 
accident that Nietzsche uses aphorisms to express himself, because they reflect 
best the discontinuity and chaos of the text.
Of course interpretation can only be understood in the context of value. To 
know for Nietzsche is to evaluate. The text does not manifest itself to a passive 
interpreter v.ho is content to reflect the changing meanings and images, rather 
the interpreter is in a relation to the text which favors the creative construction of 
forms so that the resulting judgment does not mean ‘this is true' but rather ‘this is 
what I want to be true in this or that way.’ In this context we can better under­
stand why Nietzsche said that the will to knowledge must be transformed into a 
will of appropriation and conquest.
This construction of form is a vehicle of the desires, interests and emo­
tions of the individual, so that the form/meaning is properly characterized as a 
value. The creative power in human beings resides in the fact that all that consti­
tutes the external world is for each of us the sum of our value judgments. A lot of 
these value judgments, colours for example, are hereditary. The normative 
spontaneity of life thus manifests itself in our intellectual operations. Moreover 
when he says “The real and the apparent world - I have traced this antithesis 
back to value relations. We have projected the conditions of our preservation as 
predicates of being in general“ (WP, 3,#507). Nietzsche explains how values
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decide what is held as true under the normative principle of what is useful to life, 
and since life is the will to power, whatever is useful is that which helps us to sur­
pass ourselves.
Truth then, for Nietzsche, takes on the mantle of useful error without 
which some of us cannot live. Nor does Nietzsche reject this sort of truth simply 
because it lacks the absolute character which we normally attribute to truth. The 
falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement: it 
is here that our new language perhaps sounds strangest. The question is to what 
extent it is life-advancing, life preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even 
species-breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest 
judgements are the most indispensable to us, that without granting as true the 
fictions of logic... - that to renounce false judgments would be to renounce life, 
would be to deny life” (BGE,#4). In that sense the truth of an interpretation is not 
lasting, it is essential here to understand that "a great deal of belief must be pre­
sent; that judgments may be ventured; that doubt concerning all essential values 
is lacking - that is the precondition of every living thing and its life. Therefore, 
what is needed is that something must be held to be true - not that something is 
true" (WP, 3, #507).
Genealogy is the method by which we learn to appreciate the value of val­
ues. It is called genealogy because it tries to trace the origins of normative acts 
Its aim is to track the judgment back to its ‘centre’ of interpretation. Genealogical 
research starts with the observation and description of what Nietzsche calls 
morality - a system of value judgments in relation with the conditions of existence 
of certain beings. Genealogy is justified because if what is living expresses, by
page 75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the choice of its values, the intelligence of what is useful to life, it exposes itself 
to a critical interrogation concerning its own value, which can then be used a 
measure by which it can be situated on a scale of classification. Genealogy then 
evaluates the originating value of this ‘morality’ by treating it as a set of symp­
toms which are indicative of the life they produce. This method enables us to dis­
tinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ values. Under negative values we find 
the morality of the slave, as that resulting from moral dualism described earlier. 
Positive values are those which align themselves with the vital pulse that is the 
will to power. Behind the conflict between positive and negative values are two 
antagonistic tendencies a type of life that is ascendant and one that is decadent.
It should be noted that genealogy revolutionizes the whole idea of critique. 
Within the framework of metaphysical dogmatism, a convincing critique was one 
which could refute with logic the arguments of the opposition. For Nietzsche this 
kind of critique is inspired by Socratic optimism and touches only on reasons and 
proofs without changing the real causes of error. The real causes of error are illu­
sions imposed by certain conditions of existence which are translated into val­
ues, and into a specific morality. In that context, nihilism, as the crisis in values 
caused by moral dualism, is the symptom of a disease - decadence.
It is genealogy which has helped Nietzsche to understand that nihilism 
was necessary, by tracing the origins of the the development of the spirit. “For 
why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we have 
had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents the 
ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals - because we must 
experience nihilism before we can find out what value these Values’ really had”
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(WP, preface, #4).
The birth of the Spirit and Self Overcoming of Morality
For Nietzsche the spirit was constituted by the transformation of instincts 
which, under certain circumstances, bring about bad conscience through the 
process of internalization. “All instincts which do not find a vent without, turn 
inwards - this is what I mean by the growing ‘internalization’ of man” (GM, 
p. 100). Moreover, human beings tormented in this way cannot find any sponta­
neous outlet because their instincts have been repressed by the structures for 
peace and order in the society which repressed them in the first place. So they 
turned to the rigid and brutal directives of their conscience in its rational func­
tions: “they were reduced, were those unhappy creatures, to thinking, inferring, 
calculating, putting together causes and results, reduced to that poorest and 
most erratic organ of theirs, their consciousness” (GM, p.100). Repressed, the 
instincts give birth to a terrible feeling of guilt of which the agent is the bad con­
science. But this bad conscience is not all bad: “this wholly active bad con­
science has finally - true fountainhead as it is of idealism and imagination - pro­
duced an abundance of novel and amazing beauty and affirmation" (GM, p.105.) 
Indeed bad conscience wakes up the spirit by forcing it to develop a reflexive 
conscience, with the aptitudes for abstraction and rationality that that entails. 
The spirit is thus a work of art, insofar as all art emerges from a freedom that 
becomes creative by the very force of the restrictions imposed upon it.
Of course this wonderful potential was halted and poisoned by the notion 
of sin — that machiavellian invention of the priest to ensure his universal domi-
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nation. “Sin - for that is the name of the new priestly version of the animal bad 
conscience - has up to the present been the greatest event in the history of the 
diseased soul: in sin we find the most perilous and fatal masterpiece of religious 
interpretation” (GM, p. 183). But nihilism, by proclaiming the death of God, 
reveals the abyss, fabricated by the will to vengeance of the priests. By revealing 
the ontological idealism of philosophers, it proves to be lucid to a point that 
requires us to ask what motivates it. What motivates it is morality itself! “You see 
what it was that really triumphed over the Christian God, Christian morality itself, 
the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more rigorously, the father 
confessors refinement of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated 
into scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price" (GS,5,#357). 
Indeed "among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this eventually 
turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial perspective - and now 
the recognition of this inveterate mendaciousness that one despairs of shedding 
becomes a stimulant” (WP, 1,#5). The will to know is thus the instrument which 
overcomes morality as it used to be.
This will to know is a passion, a powerful new force that keeps growing. It
is the spirit of heroic philosophy and it will, according to Nietzsche, liberate us
from nihilism by creating and bringing about
a more virile, warlike age... which will restore honour to courage 
above all. For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and 
it shall gather the strength that this higher age will require some 
day - the a<pe that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge 
and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their conse­
quences. (GS,4,#283)
It is the antidote to the vulgarity of mediocre beings who are motivated only by 
selfish interests and banal comforts. Nietzsche warns us, “for nothing is more
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precious to me, and rarer, than honesty. (Z, p. 559) This honesty is precious to 
Nietzsche because it is essential to respect scrupulously the text of reality, to 
abstain from trying to hide or to erase anything from that text, no matter how 
awful of frightening it becomes. This involves holding back on judgment in order 
to let things speak for themselves as in the art of interpretation, and which 
Nietzsche considers noble and guided by a sense of justice, which is to give to 
each object, alive or dead, real or imagined, its proper place.
This passion or will to knowledge requires an existential commitment 
which requires a great love and a great courage because the ultimate truth of 
knowledge is a tragic truth. The tragic truth is inhuman in that it marks the disso­
nance between what we desire and what is, the radical strangeness of being in 
relation to human existence. Because behind all interpretations there is still 
chaos as its limit. The necessity of this limit makes Nietzsche say that the 
immoderate need for knowledge is as barbaric as the hatred of knowledge. He 
brings us to the height of paradox with this affirmation because it leads him to 
radical doubt and to the rejection of unconditional truth. He questions the right of 
truth to impose itself as an absolute and brings us back to the considerations of 
the rights of illusion and error because if we get out of the world of perspectives 
we would destroy the illusions necessary to humanity. So the desire for justice 
(justice being what is due to all things - i.e. truth) above all else would lead to our 
destruction. The truth of chaos can only be perceived out of the comer of our eye 
during an instant of intense concentration. Illusion and truth are forever engaged 
in combat, a friendly competition which fits in well with what we know of the will 
to power.
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Love
In his most beautiful and moving essay, called “Faith and the Multiversity” 
(in Technology and Justice) Grant shows just what it means to be a Christian and 
a Platonist in modem technological society. In spite of Nietzsche, Grant is not 
ready to give up images of truth and beauty, indeed his call to us to remember, to 
think and to love, is a challenge to consider what has been given us in our tradi­
tions together with the reality of the modem world.
Grant starts from a quote by the French mystic and philosopher Simone 
Weil: “faith is the experience that the intelligence is enlightened by love” (TJ, 
p.38). For him what is given in that statement about love is that it “consents] to 
the fact that there is authentic otherness" (TJ, p.39). Grant reminds us that clas­
sical philosophy taught that we love otherness, not because it is other, but 
because it is beautiful. It was believed that to experience the beauty of otherness 
was open to everyone, in different ways and at different levels of perfection. “ 
Nevertheless, any statement about the beauty of the world is so easily doubted 
in our era, because it appears meaningless within the dominant language of 
modem science” (TJ, p.39). The language of objectivity has superseded the pla- 
tonic language of beauty which suggested that love, based on trust, is the appro­
priate response to a beautiful world, which is itself the image of goodness. It radi­
cally subjectivised beauty - ‘ beauty is in the eye of the beholder’- and its lan­
guage obscured the beauty of the world. The literal meaning of object, Grant 
reminds us, “speaks of anything which is held away from us for our questioning” 
(TJ, p.40). But if our attention to things is limited to this holding back, we cannot 
love them as beautiful. The idea, largely held in our era, that love is blind, repre­
sents well how difficult the understanding of the language of beauty has become
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within our modem paradigm of knowledge. Love is subjectivised, relegated to 
feelings we may have for friends, lovers or family, as opposed to being the act 
through which we come to recognize otherness and its beauty or recognized as 
a beautiful act of trust and commitment.
The affirmation that human beings know more about something through 
loving it was first taught by Socrates. “Plato uses the image of the sun, the line 
and the cave to write of the journey of the mind into knowledge. In those images 
sight is used as a metaphor for love. Our various journeys out of the shadows 
and imaginings of opinion into the truth depend on the movements of our minds 
through love into the lovable “ (TJ, p.73) This affirmation is the main reason, 
according to Grant, that Christianity chose Platonism to guide it in thinking the 
relation of such divine events as the Incarnation and the Trinity to our day to day 
lives, primarily because it asserts the primacy of goodness itself. Grant points 
out that Christianity is as much the ‘practice of dying’ as philosophy, in that turn­
ing to either one we “come quickly to the two great deaths which stand at the ori­
gin of western life and thought” (TJ, p.72).
In accepting that knowledge is dependent on how we love, we better 
understand why Plato said that the opposite of knowledge is not ignorance, but 
madness. The tyrant is an example of complete madness because for him other­
ness has completely disappeared. Moreover, without denying that there are dif­
ferent kinds of love, it is not wise to draw sharp distinctions between them, as 
happened when eros (need-love) was placed on the side of philosophy, and 
agape (charity, or gift-love) was placed on the side of Christianity. To do so is to 
forget that love is one, as was expressed in the fable in Plato’s Symposium.
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“Eros was begotten at a celebration for the birth of Aphrodite. The parents were 
two beggars, Fullness and Need. Eros not only goes around as a beggar but is 
in itself the activity of begetting upon the beautiful, both in bodies and in souls “ 
(TJ, p.74).
It is difficult for us to understand how being is goodness, and how we 
come to love its beauty, because the modem paradigm of knowledge has emp­
tied into uncertainty any conception of the good. “The first stage of this emptying 
was when good came to be used simply in discourse about human ethical ques­
tions” (TJ, p.41). What was meant in classical philosophy by ‘good’, involved 
much more than morality, “ a boring word" (TJ, 76), it involved a whole view of 
the world. That is why Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity and Greek philosophy is 
an attack based first on their metaphysics, and not their definition of what a good 
deed is. Moreover the emptiness of the word ‘good’ in modernity can be seen by 
the emptiness of its replacement (of which Nietzsche was the chief originator) - 
values. What is a value? Even Nietzsche will not tell us. It is so vague that it is 
generally used in the plural, as values.
On the other hand, ‘good’, in the old language, was defined as “what any 
being is fitted for. It is good for animals to breathe; we are not if we do not.” As 
human beings we are fitted “to live well together in community and to try to think 
openly about the nature of the whole" (TJ, p.42). To do so is to fulfill the purpose 
which was given to us as rational human beings, and good is present to the 
extent to which we fulfill those purposes. In order to avoid this image of the good 
being swallowed up by the modem view of temporality as futurity, Grant uses the 
example of children: a child is good, not in preparation for anything better, but as
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it is, and we love them for what they are, for their being itself. In children we can 
see most clearly that the ultimate cause of being is beneficence. That this lan­
guage was developed by people who were aware of suffering is without a doubt, 
but they believed that the evil of suffering can only be recognized if it is seen as 
deprivation of good.
Of course this language of a given goodness is founded on trust. “We 
start with trust in our knowledge of those things we are presented with immedi­
ately, and doubt is the means of moving to an understanding of what makes pos­
sible that trust in an educated human being” (TJ, p.43). It is only in modernity 
that systematic thought became synonymous with doubt.
Our modem understanding of things in terms of necessity and chance, as 
opposed to the affirmation of the goodness of being, came, according to Grant, 
when scientists started to define their activity against the Aristotelian science 
which described things through the concept of purpose. The Christian church 
was the main cause of this turning away from medieval science. It became tri- 
umphalist when it asserted
that purpose in nature pointed to an overriding purpose given for 
the universe as a whole... the more representable the purpose of 
the whole was said to be, the more this natural theology became a 
trivializing, a blasphemy against the Cross. Some of the most 
depressing episodes in Christian history have been the spilling of 
much ink to show that the universe as a whole vouchsafed a repre­
sentable purpose of design analogous to the way that the purpose 
of the automaker is given in the design of the automobile. (TJ, 
p.44)
It is not surprising then that.science turned away from the idea of purpose.
Still, Grant affirms goodness. He believes that all proceeds from benefi-
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cence. In saying that the beauty of the world is an indication of its goodness, of 
its purpose, isn’t he perpetrating the same blasphemy of which he accused the 
church? The blasphemy which leads to the assertion “that evil is good and good 
is evil” (TJ, p.44). Saying that there is a representable purpose to the whole often 
leads to a trivializing of suffering, to saying that suffering, caused by evil, is ulti­
mately a good, since it is part of the world, of being, and being is goodness. 
Grant sees clearly the ravages and consequences of saying that providence is 
scrutable, and in affirming that being is goodness he warns clearly that we must 
not use the language of good and purpose to trivialize suffering. The only way to 
do that is to acknowledge the fact that the purpose of the whole is not repre­
sentable and not scrutable, but to say that
for both Christianity and Platonism, goodness itself is an ambigu­
ous mystery. In Christianity, God's essence is unknowable. In The 
Republic it is said that goodness itself is beyond being. Both 
Christianity and Platonism have therefore often been ridiculed as 
final irrationality. If the purpose of the thought is to have knowledge 
of the whole, how can we end in an affirmation which is a negation 
of knowing? (TJ, p.75)
But to acknowledge this is not to say that there is no purpose in the world. 
Grant uses art as a prime example of the fact that purpose can be present with­
out being scrutable. Art is purposive because it is made by human beings, and 
although certain works of art can be understood partially in terms of their exter­
nal purposes, such as that they are made with paint or plaster, it is not clear that 
we can represent to ourselves the purpose of Bach’s concertos or of 
Shakespeare’s King Lear. And although nowadays much of the purpose of art is 
reduced to its entertainment value, for Grant and more generally for art lovers, 
art is much more than that. The purpose of a work of art is not properly repre­
sented as merely entertainment. Indeed the greater the work of art the less its
page 84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
purpose can be represented at all" (TJ, p.46). So that even though we can study 
art in order to better understand the relations of the parts to the whole, “the stag­
gered silence v/ith which we can watch King Lear is evidence that something of 
great import is before us.... Whether watched or read it clearty has a purpose. 
When we are enraptured we can say that it seems purposiveness itself. But can 
we ever represent that purpose to ourselves?” (TJ, p.46). No we can't, because 
this purposiveness is more than “the gathering together of the means employed 
by the author" (TJ, p.46). The enrapturing which we experience when we are 
faced with great works of art is the immediate partaking in their beauty, which 
points to some unrepresentable good. Grant is not about to tell us about the cri­
teria by which we can judge the goodness or quality of works of art; the example 
of art is a useful one to him only because it shows very clearly that purpose, 
even if not representable, is present.
Nietzsche has often criticized those who, when speaking of art, only 
speak of it from the perspective of the spectator. For him art is the great protec­
tor of life as will to power because it is a creative act. He places the emphasis on 
this creative aspect of art, so that all that it is created, even the body, becomes a 
work of art, and a testimony to the greatness of the creative act. Grant, perhaps 
conscious of this criticism, quotes a letter in which Mozart describes what is 
involved for him in composing a piece. He says:
When I am well and have good surroundings, travelling in a car­
riage after a good meal or a walk or at night when 1 cannot sleep, 
then ideas come to me best and in torrents. Where they come from 
and how I just do not know. I keep in my head those that please me 
and hum them aloud as others have told me. When I have that all 
carefully in my head, the rest comes quickly, one thing after anoth­
er.... My soul is then on fire as long as I am not disturbed; the idea 
expands, I develop it, all becoming clearer and clearer. The piece 
becomes almost complete in my head, even if it is a long one, so
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that afterwards I see it in my spirit in all one look, as one sees a 
beautiful picture or beautiful human being. I am saying that in imag­
ination I do not understand the parts one after another, in the order 
that they ought to follow in the music; I understand them all togeth­
er in one moment. Delicious moments. When the ideas are discov­
ered and put into a work, all occurs in me as in a beautiful dream 
which is quite lucid.(TJ, p.47-48)
This is an affirmation of the great love and joy which goes into the making 
of a piece, not as Nietzsche would have us believe strictly for the sake of crest­
ing, but as a partaking in beauty. It is also an example of intellectual intuition, 
which is at work in recognizing that beauty and which was denied by Kant when 
he exalted reason above understanding in the name of our autonomy. The way 
in which Mozart understood his music, and the way in which we understand the 
beauty of great works of art has nothing to do with reason as Kant defined it. 
That understanding was at its origins “ filled with that very sense of receptivry 
which Kant lessens in the name of our freedom” (TJ, p.49). This is the unde-- 
standing that Plato thought was the height for human beings, above reason or 
anything else.
So because the project of reason cannot summon up and explain the 
whole nature of the universe does not mean that we must always distrust every­
thing we know. Nor does it mean that we can’t see the nature of this whole. It 
simply means that we can never have a complete representation of it. But a rep­
resentation is just that, a re-presentation, it does not mean that the presentation 
is not there and that we cannot grasp it, if we have the courage to trust in the 
images of the good which we are given.
The beauty of the world manifests itself most intently for us in our love of,
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and in the beauty of, other people. Modem technological society, by defining 
people as nothing more than an accidental conglomerations of matter that acts, 
and placing them in the midst of a natural world understood as a resource, has 
made it difficult to understand human beings as beautiful. Evidence of that is 
seen when people are referred to as human resources. The division between 
love and intelligence in modernity is at its most striking when a populist philoso­
pher such as Sartre writes that “hell is other people.”
To Grant this division is obvious when it comes to speaking of justice. 
Justice, in the classical world, was “defined as rendering to anything what was its 
due” (TJ, p.54). It applied to everything from the body, to others, to animals, and 
the earth. As such it was more than an arrangement to be achieved in a society; 
it was also a state of being called a virtue. Nietzsche understood justice in the 
same way, only he taught that what is due to things is truth, and that that should 
not take precedence over what is expedient to the affirmation of life. But the call 
to justice is for Grant the call to be as perfect as God. “At the height of the 
Gospels we are shown the moment when a tortured being says of his torturers 
that their due is to be forgiven” (TJ, p. 54). Perfection here is not an abstraction 
isolated from the immediate requirements of the world: “we can only fulfill those 
requirements here below insofar as we partake to some degree in perfection. 
Indeed goods in the here and now are only good in that they participate in good­
ness itself.Our freedom is just our potential indifference to such a high end” (TJ, 
p.55).
This call to perfection is not easy. That is why it is hard for me to under­
stand why Nietzsche called it a slave morality. Justice is at first sight a daunting
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and unattractive prospect, we would much rather be given our due, and more, 
than to go about giving it to others. Moreover, it is very difficult to believe that we 
can have any knowledge of what is due to others. What Grant says with startling 
clarity is that “what was given in our knowledge of the whole was a knowledge of 
good which we do not measure and define, but by which we are measured and 
defined” (TJ, p.59). We come to know justice, and what is due to others, as we 
participate in it through our efforts to understand the nature of things through 
love and appreciation.
Our problem in the modem world, according to Grant, is that we have no 
way of reconciling the beauty of the world as we perceive it with our intellectual 
intuition of truth as it is presented to us by science. “Darwin’s discoveries about 
natural selection do not make the animals ugly, but neither do they tell us why 
the animals are beautiful” (TJ, p.66). To love animals as beautiful is to want them 
to be, but what is it about animals, or indeed about human beings, seen as a 
product of modification through natural selection that would make us want them 
to be?
Morality put in its place
It is now clear that any stance toward morality will be dictated by a belief 
about the nature of the universe. Indeed to believe that the universe is ordered is 
to believe that we must act in unison with that order. To believe that the universe 
is chaos is to believe that we are free to do create our own values. The modem 
paradigm of knowledge, with its objective world view, cuts us off from the beauty 
of the world. Grant and Nietzsche, as we have seen, both wrote about how such
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a way of looking at the world is as much a statement of value as looking at the 
world as unchanging goodness, or as the finality of becoming, and yet it ignores 
and denies this. In obscuring for us the beauty of the world, the modem project 
of reason reveals that all that is holding it up are the scattered remains of a view 
of justice now considered outdated and it leaves us either frantically searching 
for purpose and meaning, or free to create a whole new world.
Kant precipitated this crisis by his critique of metaphysics. He transformed 
cosmic and human nature into demands of practical reason, into moral judg­
ments. By a curious reversal of the poles of human understanding his categorical 
imperative submitted being to the regulation of desire and demanded of action 
the necessary and universal criteria that only evidence can provide. Indeed how 
can I know if my action merits to be elevated to universal law if I don’t already 
know what the universe is? Kant thus inaugurated the era where the chisel of 
individual inclination will sculpt the face of truth.
Nietzsche only fo llow s in his footsteps when he shows that any 
autonomous and any subjective morality which we give ourselves is not morally 
viable - that is how we are beyond good any evil. All morality is subjective 
because all are part of horizons, created by us. His critique of moral dualism in 
its metaphysical pretenses leads him to reject any objective morality. His psycho­
logical analysis of being leads him to conclude that subjective morality is just as 
dead, that we are indeed beyond good and evil. No morality can exist because 
reality is a mixture of negations and affirmations that are inextricably bound 
together. We must then align our desires with the reality of this chaos, and in joy 
affirm the supremacy of our creative willing.
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Grant, on the other hand, wisely steers clear of metaphysical debate, 
since he is sure to lose. Rather he makes metaphysical statements without 
attempting to defend them, leaving us free to accept or reject them. He too, says 
yes to life with all its imperfections because he sees in being images of a good­
ness which redeem. Is it naively that he is able to see being as unchanging 
goodness?
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
When I first started on this project it was my hope to be able to show that 
Grant’s world view was superior to that of Nietzsche. In attempting to do so I 
have come to better understand both Nietzsche and Grant and better under­
stand, as well, my reasons for preferring Grant’s world view. Unfortunately, the 
task has proven to be beyond the scope of this project and perhaps altogether 
impossible. Nevertheless, Grant’s call to thinking, remembering, and loving, 
shines brightly in this darkness, especially when compared to Nietzsche’s chal­
lenge of overcoming, and losing, ourselves. In the fast pace of modernity Grant 
brings us to slow down, admire the beauty surrounding us, and ponder on the 
great mysteries of life. Opposed to Nietzsche’s vision of continual renewal, which 
in a way is strangely present in the modem world of the newer and the better, it 
has its own quiet strength.
Why is it impossible to show the superiority of Grant’s world view? That is 
the question this conclusion will try to address. The short version is that any rea­
sons I may offer, while they may be convincing to one working within the same 
assumptions, will fail to appeal to whomever is not working within these same 
assumptions. These assumptions are fundamentally about being and what it rep­
resents. The question of being is a complex one, its scope is metaphysical but its 
ultimate challenge is epistemological. In modern philosophy, it has largely 
become a non-issue for reasons which will become clear in our discussion. 
Nevertheless both Nietzsche and Grant build their respective world views around
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a particular vision of being, and they both point to the consequences of sidestep­
ping the question. Yet, while we must acknowledge that the task of achieving 
certainty in the question of being is near impossible, it is nevertheless necessary 
to keep asking the questions because ultimately we must choose. We must 
choose not necessarily between Grant and Nietzsche, since there are other 
alternatives, but between conflicting world views. Nietzsche and Grant both show 
us a way in which we can choose honestly.
In Nietzsche we find a bit of everything, the eagle and the snake, the light­
ning and the sunshine, the demon and the angel. The apollonian measure allies 
itself in him to the dionysian passion: lucidity and skepticism mix with the fervor 
of the mystic. From the darkest pessimism emerges the brightest of hopes; each 
thing in Nietzsche is full of its opposite and all this alternates and participates in 
a whole in which one must be engaged in order to perceive its mysterious har­
mony. Is it possible to take seriously such a study in contrasts which contains in 
itself its own refutation? If we remain within the realm of ideal logic with its simple 
and fixed essences, then no, but we must take it seriously if we want to be in the 
realm of a concrete search for understanding, which is inevitably tied to the 
diversity of a complex and mobile existence. Isn’t life itself, as Nietzsche reminds 
us, made up of a perpetual tension and a perpetual unity between opposite ele­
ments?
Grant too reflects this tension in his writing as the tension between reason 
and revelation, between contemplation and charity. Grant outlines how a large 
part of our history has been spent in trying to reconcile these tensions. The roots
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of this tension go back to our primals: to Greek philosophy and Biblical religion 
which Grant believes offer irreconcilable accounts of human freedom. There is 
tension between the "claims of universal understanding which were found in the 
heights of Greek civilisation" and the way that "Christianity opened men to a par­
ticular consciousness of time by opening them to anxiety and charity, how willing 
was exalted through the stamping proclamations of the creating Will; how time 
was raised up by redemption in time, and the future by the exaltation of the 
eschaton"(TH, p.29). Any attempt to come to grips with what Grant means by 
this tension and its implications could fill an entire book. My purpose here, in 
speaking of this tension, is simply to show that Grant and Nietzsche alike felt 
tom between conflicting visions that pull all of us in different directions when we 
are faced with understanding and interpreting reality.
What has made comparing them an interesting challenge is the fact that, 
while they hold to conflicting visions of reality or of being, they share a common 
desire to understand it in holistic terms. Nietzsche might object to this since he 
wanted above all to break down systematic and unified thought. Nevertheless, 
he cannot deny that, like Grant, he engaged in philosophy as it was meant to be 
- as a sustained reflection upon the whole which involves taking a stand on the 
question of being. Many philosophers today no longer do this kind of philosophy 
because they have accepted the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ This is the idea that we 
cannot define how we should act based on our knowledge of the state of nature. 
Without going into long explanations of the idea, I think it is safe to say that it is 
based on an epistemology, adopted from modem science, which defines our 
modem paradigm of knowledge as the project of reason to gain objective knowl-
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edge. Such a paradigm, Grant shows us, knows being only as necessity and 
chance, which limits any discussion of being to particular description of phenom­
enon rather than explanation of the whole. Indeed, because the only objective 
knowledge we can have of the state of nature is limited to what physics can tell 
us and since physics can tell us nothing about the purposes or meaning of exis­
tence, the total autonomy of human beings in relation to nature is confirmed. If 
this is the case, why should the question of being matter? In seeing why it mat­
tered to Nietzsche and Grant, perhaps we will find an answer.
We have seen that for Nietzsche being is becoming and that for Grant 
being is seen as unchanging goodness. It is upon these rocks that they build 
their views on history and morality and it is these foundations that can lead us to 
accept or reject their respective world views. By this, I don’t mean to suggest that 
within these world views there is no room for discussion and disagreement for 
obviously there has been and will be disagreement on many points. My argu­
ment is simply that these disagreements occur within the same basic framework 
provided by the foundational premise. They would not occur at all, or would be of 
a completely different order, if that basic framework were different. For example, 
it is unlikely that someone who affirmed that being is unchanging goodness 
would argue for a perspectivist epistemology, whereas perspectivism is perfectly 
suited to the idea of being as becoming. But within that framework, one could 
also argue for relativism.
Nor do I want to say that it is impossible to reject Nietzsche’s or Grant’s 
world view based on existential criteria. One could say, for example, that
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Nietzsche’s concept of the Eternal Return is not one by which we can live without 
sinking into despair, or that his idea of morality as a constant drive for fulfillment 
does not correspond to the desire for peace and harmony which most of us feel. 
Such arguments, however, remain unsatisfying because they fail to address the 
Nietzsche who dares us to face the truth of being without blinking. They would 
also fail to address Grant since, by nature, these arguments avoid all questions 
as to the essence of being.
The truth is that we cannot avoid the question of being. Even those who 
adhere to the naturalistic fallacy are adhering to a particular vision of being, 
which, even though it tells them that human beings are autonomous, neverthe­
less colours their judgments on everything from ethics, to epistemology, to the 
po litica l good. It is even what has made them declare human beings 
autonomous.
But what is the truth of being, and how can we know it? My argument is 
that the truth of being can only be known through faith. Obviously faith cannot 
offer the kind of knowledge which is empirical or objective, rather it is a knowl­
edge which comes from understanding. As such, the knowledge provided by 
faith is close to being captured by the classical phrase "believe in order to under­
stand." At its simplest, this means that one has to have chosen a particular view 
of being in order to find the reasons to justify that choice. Reason, though it can 
and should play a role within the framework provided by an idea of being, is 
clearly in no position to decide the issue. Indeed, the use of reason will be large­
ly determined by which version of being one accepts as true. This is why
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Nietzsche was able to criticize Platonic and Kantian reason.
An appeal to faith would seem to signal the end of all philosophical dis­
cussion. Fortunately, that is not the case. Indeed, faith alone does not eliminate 
all the apparent contradictions of existence which Nietzsche so gleefully 
describes. Faith serves only to provide a framework in which the discussion of 
the contradictions takes place. In fact, faith is the only context which Nietzsche 
has left us in which such a discussion can take place.
Nietzsche, in his teachings on the Eternal Return and the Will to Power, is 
the creator of a new metaphysics of life and existence. His nev. reality does not 
dwell in a realm beyond nature and time — it is lived, experienced and suffered. 
Because it possesses existential meaning in dealing with the concrete individual 
being and his unique life, it touches the very depth of human personality and 
cannot be understood by reason alone. When Nietzsche announced that ‘God is 
dead’ he expressed the collapse of the Platonic-Christian tradition and its true’ 
world. With this collapse its supersensuous, eternal ideas and values lost their 
meaning. The result created a void, nihilism, a world without sense, permanency, 
or purpose. The contrast between the apparent world and the true world was 
reduced to a distinction between world and nothingness (WP, 4.#567). But noth­
ingness for Nietzsche is not non-being, it is the space of freedom for the new 
philosophical free spirit who creates a new metaphysics of being. With the Irue’ 
platonic world abolished so is the apparent one, and the true world is now the 
earth in which we live. This reversal of Platonism finds its fullest expression in 
the Eternal Return which represents a denial of the beyond, the timeless, and is
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an affirmation of the moments of life. Change and contradiction are no longer 
outside being, but are necessary aspects of being itself. Nietzsche’s metaphysics 
is a metaphysics of values which are transmoral by reaching into a sphere of 
being which stresses existential uniqueness and individuality. His categories of 
being, morality, and aesthetics merge into a world view that is beyond good and 
evil, beyond the beautiful and the ugly, beyond truth and falsity.
Nietzsche, as we have seen, accepts untruth as a condition of life. He cri­
tiques traditional epistemological systems as guided not by a desire for truth but 
by moralistic concerns and prejudices. He is the heir to Hume’s skepticism, 
which limits the power of pure reason to analytical truths, and the heir to Kant’s 
critical philosophy, which limits the categories of the understanding to the phe­
nomenal world. But he surpasses them in his revolt against classical rationalism 
which held to the absoluteness and certainty of knowledge and the primacy of 
reason. The problem of truth and knowledge is, for Nietzsche, a metaphysical 
one. The idea of truth as absolute and eternal presupposes the belief in a fixed 
and static universe. With the abolition of the transcendent true’ world, the world 
of the senses and of becoming is now the only world and a new concept of truth 
must be created that agrees with and grows out of the dialectical pattern of life 
itself. We saw that it is a truth that is dynamic, as full of change and contradiction 
as life itself. Error becomes a necessary part of truth and knowledge: The false­
ness of an opinion is not for us an objection to it...The question is, how far an 
opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving“(BGE, #4). 
Nietzsche accepts a truth that is contradictory and changing which implies a 
never-ending search, a never-ending will to create, and so, error becomes a part
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of truth, part of being itself, uncovered in its meaning and necessity — its 
essence is creative. Truth is not something out there to be discovered, it is 
something to be created.
Even though these arguments appear to be self-defeating, (indeed if there 
is no truth how can we know that what Nietzsche says about it is true?), 
Nietzsche has managed to accomplish just what he wanted. His criticisms of tra­
ditional philosophy all stem from a disgust with the dogmatic and the universal, 
his world view is individualistic in the extreme. And so he never presents his 
teachings as systematic or as true, merely as his own perspective and, by doing 
so, he manages to avoid falling into dogmatism while at the same time his per­
spective is allowed to thrive on its own contradictions. He wins both ways.
For the purposes of our argument (that being can only be known through 
faith) this is the question which interests us: on what basis can we say that truth 
has any value? The only basis for affirming the value of truth is to believe that 
there is something true, that is, that a particular statement corresponds to reality. 
But such a belief, Nietzsche has pointed out, can only be affirmed if we presup­
pose a world of fixed essences where reality can be known and is not always 
changing. How are we to know that such a world exists? Science today repudi­
ates the possibility of rational certainty and predictable causality. The principles 
of physics combined with mathematical ambiguity have made of science a 
breeding ground of paradoxes for reason so there can be no empirical knowl­
edge of the essence of being. Nietzsche himself has undermined reason so 
much that Homo sapiens has been replaced with Homo faber - a creature of
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practical drives and practical needs which cannot, through reason, gain any 
insight into the intelligible order of things and discover objective and absolute 
truth. Reason, within a worfd of becoming, is seen rather as an organizing power 
that imposes its own logical forms to order and synthesize experience.
So, all we are left with is faith. Indeed, Nietzsche, by showing rightly, that 
the role assigned to reason is pre-determined by a belief in a specific kind of 
being, leaves us with no other grounds for discussion. Whether he realized this 
or not is an interesting question. He probably did, since to my knowledge he 
never tries to prove or justify his own belief in being as becoming. It is just 
asserted as though it were obvious.
Unlike Grant, whose faith reaches outward, Nietzsche’s faith in being as 
becoming is an inward faith. It is a faith in man and his instincts. It is a faith in the 
power of man to create his own world since there is nothing solid out there upon 
which to rely. This isn’t even a faith in mankind, rather it is a faith in the individual 
since, for Nietzsche, most of us will remain as sheep allowing only the few to 
ascend to greater heights.
Grant, on the other hand, adopts Simone Weil’s definition of faith as "the 
experience of intelligence enlightened by love". Nietzsche would have us believe 
that love is not altruistic; that it is never pure; that it is selfish; that what we give, 
we give only for what it gives us. Of course, there is no way to deny that the love 
that we feel is never pure of selfish motives. When Grant is inspired by Simone 
Weil’s phrase that “faith is the experience of intelligence enlightened by love”,
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however, he is not referring to the purity of love. Rather, he is referring to the fact 
that love takes us out of ourselves and brings us to recognize otherness. It is a 
reaching out and a placing of trust in something real and solid. Grant, as we 
have seen, then proceeds to show us how we come to love otherness not 
because it is other but because it is beautiful. He demontrates, as well, how that 
beauty is an image of goodness itself. Human love, in all its impurities, still brings 
to us a whole other world — a world made present to us by the simple placing of 
trust in something other than ourselves.
We all start out with needs, says Grant, and are dependent on others to 
meet them but, as we grow, we forget this because with self-consciousness 
comes the tendency to make ourselves the center. We develop the understand­
ing that our survival depends on our own efforts. When self-serving dominates 
we are at the furthest from love and the recognition of otherness. Our loves are 
determined by a variety of necessities and chances which constitute our desires, 
and as such they are all at varying degrees of imperfection; the lowest being 
complete self-serving; and the highest being complete giving. That these two 
extremes rarely exist is no reason to qualify love as nothing but impure selfish 
emotion. Love, pure or impure, is a measure of trust which we give. It is, as 
such, that it can represent otherness as beauty, and beauty as an image of the 
good. Grant here uses the language of Plato to affirm that the ultimate cause of 
being is beneficence.
The problem with this is that the world is not always beautiful, or easy to 
love. War, suffering, starvation, torture, and disease, are all so many indicators
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that being is not always good. If it is not always good, how can it be defined as 
good? And how can its cause be beneficence? Grant struggled all his life with 
this question. His answer is that these evils could only be recognized as such if 
they were seen as deprivations of good. In this he is right in a way which 
Nietzsche himself acknowledged when he condemned the antitheses of values 
and made us see that if being is becoming then we are beyond both good and 
evil.
Grant’s answer is for him intelligible only within the Christian faith. That is 
one way, but there are others. Love is not limited as an experience to Christians. 
We are all open to it in varying degrees. For Grant, love starts as love of one 
owns (family, friends), then extends outwards towards community and nation and 
finally love of the good. That this last is for him indissociable from God is obvious 
but others can and will express it differently. Grant acknowledges this and, in an 
undogmatic way for a Christian, expresses Gandhi’s belief that there are many 
different paths leading up to the same mountaintop. In the end, this only confirms 
the earlier argument I made stating that within the framework of a particular 
vision of being there is room for disagreement.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to explore Grant’s answer because the 
question of evil is unavoidable if one is to affirm the unchanging goodness of 
being. Nietzsche, perhaps more than any other thinker, was seduced by a nos­
talgia for extremes. That out of good things evil sometimes happens, and that 
out of evil deeds, good things could come, meant to him that good and evil were 
categories that needed to be transcended. What he forgets is that extremes con-
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verge towards nothingness in all things created; only in God can they exist 
together. Grant believes it is only through God that necessity and goodness can 
be reconciled. That reconciliation is brought about by divine love as the bridge 
between necessity and goodness.
That we experience a separation between necessity and goodness in the 
world does not mean that these orders don’t have the same origin in Goodness 
itself. Nor does it mean that Providence doesn’t exist, just that it isn’t scrutable. If 
it were scrutable, as the triumphalist western Christian church affirmed, then evil 
becomes good and good becomes evil. Here, Grant accepts Nietzsche’s criti­
cism of Christianity as leading to nihilism. But for him this is only one version of 
Christianity, and a blasphemous one. "The more representable the purpose of 
whole was said to be, the more this natural theology became a trivializing, a 
blasphemy against the Cross" ( TJ, p.44). For Grant, to believe that our final pur­
poses can be known from the way things are in the world leads us to avoid the 
mystery of evil making us forget the distance between necessity and the good 
and ultimately turning us away from the Cross.
Grant does not, as Nietzsche did, turn away from the purposiveness of 
being. For him, the bringing together of necessity and goodness is most clearly 
expressed in the theology of the Cross. Indeed it is through the theology of the 
Cross that Grant is able to accept that evil can exist in a world created as good 
by a beneficent God. On the Cross the absolute absence of justice is met with 
justice. Christ is both the victor and the victim. He offers himself willingly, yet he 
submits in spite of himself, out of love for us. The Cross encompasses all these
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contradictions, acknowledging and meeting evil with love and forgiveness. So, in 
order to believe that good is good and evil its absence, one has to acknowledge 
that the world is as it is while remaining uncertain as to its final purposes. To do 
so is to love truth. As Simone Weil says Truth is not the object of love, but reali­
ty. To desire truth is to desire a contact with a piece of reality. To desire contact 
with a piece of reality is to love" (The Need for Roots, p.253).
In order for this to make sense we must adhere to the old dictum "believe 
in order to understand". This brings us back to the statement we made earlier 
about how it is that we can know that truth has value. We saw that, for 
Nietzsche, truth has value in so far as it serves to enhance life. Grant however, 
believes that truth has value if it correspond to reality - a reality that we can know 
and understand if we reach out and trust. Only through believing in being as 
unchanging goodness can we be in a position where we can know and begin 
understanding its truth, such a faith is the act of love to which Grant and Weil 
refer.
Of course, the appeal of Nietzsche’s call to creative willing is not to be 
denied. It is very appealing to see ourselves as the masters of our destinies for 
in many ways we are. Taken to an individualistic extreme, it is the urge to 
become better and stronger, to create great things. The call to create in joy is 
particularly appealing. And yet, there is nothing in the vision of eternity as 
unchanging goodness which denies those things. On the contrary, we are urged 
onward toward perfection, with God as our model and standard for judging. Nor 
should we think, as Nietzsche would have it, that it is weakness and fear which
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urge us to choose eternity as unchanging goodness. Grant makes it clear that 
Christianity is a hard doctrine. Not just nard to follow, but difficult to accept as 
well. It is hard to follow because it demands of us precisely that we reach for that 
perfection, knowing full well that it is out of our reach. Hard to accept because 
redemption is offered at the price of suffering, and our acceptance of that suffer­
ing as purposeful.
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